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FOREWORD
U.S. political and military difﬁculties in Iraq have prompted
comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. How, in fact, do
the two wars compare? What are the differences and similarities,
and what insights can be gained from examining them? Does the
Vietnam War have instructive lessons for those dealing with today’s
challenges in Iraq, or is that war simply irrelevant?
In the pages that follow, two highly qualiﬁed analysts address
these questions. Dr. Jeffrey Record, formerly a civilian paciﬁcation
advisor in Vietnam and author of books on both the Vietnam and
Iraq wars, and W. Andrew Terrill, author and co-author of several
SSI studies on Iraq, conclude that the military dimensions of the two
conﬂicts bear little comparison. Among other things, the sheer scale
of the Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred
dwarfs that of the Iraq War. They also conclude, however, that failed
U.S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic
political support for U.S. war aims in Vietnam are issues pertinent to
current U.S. policy in Iraq.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
as a contribution to the national security debate over Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

Unfolding events in Iraq have prompted some observers to
make analogies to the American experience in the Vietnam War.
The United States has, they argue, stumbled into another overseas
“quagmire” from which there is no easy or cheap exit.
Reasoning by historical analogy is an inherently risky business
because no two historical events are completely alike and because
policymakers’ knowledge and use of history are often distorted
by ignorance and political bias. In the case of Iraq and Vietnam,
extreme caution should be exercised in comparing two wars so far
apart in time, locus, and historical circumstances. In fact, a careful
examination of the evidence reveals that the differences between the
two conﬂicts greatly outnumber the similarities. This is especially
true in the strategic and military dimensions of the two wars. There
is simply no comparison between the strategic environment, the
scale of military operations, the scale of losses incurred, the quality
of enemy resistance, the role of enemy allies, and the duration of
combat.
Such an emphatic judgment, however, may not apply to at least
two aspects of the political dimensions of the Iraq and Vietnam
wars: attempts at state-building in an alien culture, and sustaining
domestic political support in a protracted war against an irregular
enemy. It is, of course, far too early predict whether the United
States will accomplish its policy objectives in Iraq and whether
public support will “stay the course” on Iraq. But policymakers
should be mindful of the reasons for U.S. failure to create a politically
legitimate and militarily viable state in South Vietnam, as well as for
the Johnson and Nixon administrations’ failure to sustain sufﬁcient
domestic political support for the accomplishment of U.S. political
objectives in Indochina. Repetition of those failures in Iraq could
have disastrous consequences for U.S. foreign policy.
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IRAQ AND VIETNAM:
DIFFERENCES, SIMILARITIES, AND INSIGHTS
Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill
INTRODUCTION
Many of those who questioned the U.S. invasion of Iraq and now
doubt the chances of creating a stable and prosperous democracy
in that country have invoked America’s experience in Vietnam as
an analogy. In their view, the United States has yet again stumbled
into a foreign quagmire--a protracted and indecisive political and
military struggle from which the United States is unlikely to extricate
itself absent expenditure of considerable blood and treasure and
abandonment of its policy objectives.
Conversely, proponents of the Iraq War and optimists over Iraq’s
future have dismissed the Vietnam analogy as misleading, even
irrelevant. For them, the differences between the two wars vastly
outnumber the similarities; the appropriate analogy is not Vietnam,
but rather the total destruction of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan
and their transformation into democratic allies. Still others believe
some elements of Vietnam are present in Iraq--e.g., both wars
involved counterinsurgency operations, but not others--e.g., there is
no counterpart in the Iraq War to North Vietnam, and that the nonanalogous elements dominate.1
The Vietnam War’s entry into the debate over the Iraq War and
its aftermath probably was inevitable. The Vietnam War continues
to inﬂuence American attitudes toward the use of force overseas,
and the analogy of Vietnam has been a staple of critics of U.S.
intervention in foreign internal wars since the fall of Saigon in 1975.
The Vietnam War was moreover a deﬁning foreign policy event for
the generation of political and military leaders now in power. It was
also the last major counterinsurgency experience of the U.S. Army
and Marine Corps, which re-encountered the counterinsurgency
mission in Iraq.
Are there instructive comparisons between the U.S. military and
political experiences in Vietnam in the 1960s and the challenges it
faces in Iraq today? If so, can those comparisons usefully inform
1

current U.S. policy in Iraq? Are there lessons from America’s defeat
in Vietnam that can be applied to promote U.S. success in Iraq?
Indeed, what were the lessons of the Vietnam War?
At ﬁrst glance the contrasts between the Vietnam and Iraq wars
would seem to overwhelm the similarities. To begin with, Vietnam
in the 1960s was a country with a long national history and powerful
national identity forged by centuries of ﬁerce resistance to foreign
rule and domination. The Communists had successfully mobilized
that nationalism against the French (as they were subsequently to do
against the United States) and had developed a doctrine of protracted
irregular warfare that pitted Vietnamese strengths against Western
weaknesses. In contrast, Iraq is a relatively young state plagued by
ethnic and religious divisions that threaten national unity.
In Vietnam the United States went to war with a pre-GoldwaterNichols conscript military against a highly experienced, skilled,
disciplined, and operationally ﬂexible enemy that enjoyed enormous
external material support and considerable international legitimacy.
In Iraq, highly-professional U.S. joint forces quickly overwhelmed
a politically isolated and militarily incompetent foe. Additionally,
whereas in Vietnam the nature of war evolved from an insurgency
into a predominantly conventional conﬂict, in Iraq it moved exactly-and quickly--in the opposite direction, from major conventional
combat into an insurgent war.
The nature of insurgent warfare in Vietnam and Iraq also
differed. In Vietnam, the Communists waged a classic, peasantbased, centrally directed, three-stage, Maoist model insurgency,
culminating in a conventional military victory. The Communists
also had a clear and well-publicized political, economic, and social
agenda. In Iraq, small, scattered, and disparate groups wage a much
smaller-scale war of ambushes, assassinations, car bombings, and
sabotage against U.S. and other coalition forces and reconstruction
targets, including Iraqis collaborating with coalition forces. Nor do
the insurgents have an explicit set of war aims.
U.S. war aims and freedom of military action were also much more
limited in Vietnam than they are in Iraq. The United States sought
only to defend South Vietnam, not overthrow North Vietnam.
American military power in Indochina moreover was checked by
the threat of Chinese intervention, and more broadly by the Soviet
threat worldwide. Today, the United States enjoys uncontested
2

global military primacy and seeks nothing less than revolutionary
regime change in Iraq.
In Vietnam, the United States committed a peak-strength force
of over 500,000 troops and withdrew after 8 years of major combat
operations that incurred 58,000 American dead and 305,000
wounded.2 In Iraq, U.S. forces overwhelmed Iraqi military resistance
in 3 weeks and continue to conduct operations against a small and
manageable insurgency, all at a cost of—as of mid-April 2004—685
dead.
From neither a strategic nor an operational standpoint does
there appear to be any signiﬁcant and meaningful comparison
between Iraq and Vietnam. The wars and the backdrop of the
global distribution of power against which they were waged were as
different as night and day.
It is from the political standpoint that Vietnam may harbor some
pertinent lessons, or at least warnings, for U.S. policymakers on
Iraq. This seems especially the case in the areas of legitimacy and
sustainability. The United States is now seeking to do in Iraq what
it failed to do in South Vietnam: create and sustain an indigenous
government and political order that the Iraqi people will accept as
legitimate and successfully ﬁght to defend. The Republic of Vietnam
was a Cold War creation of the United States and for its brief and
corrupt 20-year history remained utterly dependent for its survival
on America military power and economic and technical assistance.
As such, it was a politically attractive target to the Communists, who
claimed that the regime in Saigon was illegitimate. In the end, there
were simply not enough South Vietnamese who were prepared to
ﬁght, and if necessary die, to preserve the non-Communist political
order as it was then conﬁgured.
It did not help, of course, that the United States eventually
abandoned South Vietnam to its fate, which brings us to the issue
of sustainability. The Communist strategy of protracted war
succeeded in part because it correctly identiﬁed the American center
of gravity as public opinion. The limited and abstract nature of U.S.
objectives in Indochina meant that there were limits to the domestic
political sustainability of the American war effort. Over time, the
combination of continuing losses of blood and treasure with no
apparent deﬁnitive policy progress turned public and congressional
opinion against the war, at least as it was being conducted. This
3

situation prompted a steady withdrawal of U.S. forces and accession
to a negotiated settlement that effectively abandoned South Vietnam
to its Communist foe. (The Paris Peace Accord of January 1973
mandated the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from South
Vietnam, while leaving in place there over 200,000 North Vietnamese
Army troops. Under the circumstances, it was unrealistic to expect
South Vietnamese forces alone to accomplish what U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces had failed to accomplish after 8 years of major
combat operations.)
State-building in Iraq is still a work in progress, and it is
impossible at this juncture to make conclusive judgments on the
domestic political sustainability of U.S. policy in Iraq. Though the
United States incurred unexpected casualties and occupation costs
in post-Saddam Iraq, they bear no comparison with those of the
Vietnam War. On the other hand, by virtue of the Vietnam War
(and subsequent failed interventions in Lebanon and Somalia), U.S.
public and congressional tolerance levels for protracted, indecisive
conﬂict are not what they were in 1965.
This monograph seeks to identify and examine key comparisons
between the challenges the United States faces in Iraq today and
those it confronted in Vietnam for the purpose of offering historical
insights to U.S. policymakers responsible for policy and operations
in Iraq. We believe that differences between Iraq and Vietnam can be
just as important as similarities in providing policy insights.
The monograph assesses differences and similarities in the
following areas: relative U.S. military power; war aims; nature,
duration, and scale of the war; U.S. manpower loss rates; the
enemy; military operations; paciﬁcation; role of indigenous and
international allies; challenges of state-building; and challenges of
sustaining domestic political support. It ends with conclusions and
recommendations.
COMPARISONS: THEN AND NOW
Relative U.S. Military Power.
Profound differences separate the global and regional military
balances of the Vietnam and Iraq wars. The balances of 1965
signiﬁcantly limited U.S. freedom of military action; those of 2003,
4

in contrast, encouraged preventive war. In 2003 the United States
enjoyed uncontested conventional military supremacy, global in
scope. As the sole remaining superpower and possessor of the most
combat-effective conventional military forces on the planet, the
United States was not militarily dependent, as it had been during
the Cold War, on major allied force contributions. Furthermore, it
could use force with strategic and operational impunity relative to
the constraints America faced in Vietnam in 1965, which was a Cold
War-driven intervention.
During the Cold War, U.S. freedom of military action was
checked in much of Eurasia by the Soviet Union and China, the
dominant land powers in their respective regions. Any local war
with a lesser Communist state risked provoking escalation by
Moscow or Beijing. Additionally, war with the Soviet Union risked
uncontrollable escalation into a mutually suicidal nuclear exchange.
In the case of the Vietnam War, fear of provoking direct Chinese
and even Soviet intervention signiﬁcantly restrained the application
of U.S. military power. President Lyndon Johnson, mindful of
China’s surprise intervention in the Korean War and its disastrous
political consequences for the Truman administration, prudently
restricted the pace and parameters of the U.S. air war against North
Vietnam for fear of igniting China’s entry into the war.3 Even
absent direct Chinese or Soviet military intervention, Beijing and
Moscow provided massive assistance that enabled the Vietnamese
Communists to sustain military operations, modernize their forces,
and “attrit” American will.
In contrast, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was isolated in 2003; his
former superpower patron had disappeared and his military forces,
largely wrecked in 1991, had been subsequently denied access to
modernizing technologies. Moreover, the post-1991 U.S. threats to
support a military coup in Iraq appear to have prevented Saddam
from training his units in urban warfare, which he seemed to view
as regime-threatening.4 Training in general was not a priority for
the Iraqi military, and this shortcoming quickly became apparent
after the beginning of the U.S. invasion of 2003. Thus in 2003
U.S. and coalition forces required less than a month to crush Iraqi
conventional military resistance, take Baghdad, and overthrow
Saddam Hussein.
At the regional level, the military balance between the United
5

States and the Vietnamese Communists was not nearly so favorable
in the 1960s. Most U.S. “general purpose” forces were tied down
across a host of Cold War commitments outside of Southeast Asia;
indeed, at the peak of U.S. force deployments in 1969, the U.S. Army
withheld only one division in strategic reserve in the United States.
The Communists beneﬁted from massive Soviet, Chinese, and
other Bloc materiel and manpower assistance, including transfers
of highly competitive Soviet military technologies, and they had
also perfected a style of warfare that capitalized on both their own
strengths as well as U.S. weaknesses. Additionally, though there was
never any question that the United States had the power to destroy
North Vietnam, the limited scope of U.S. war aims (in contrast to the
total war the Communists waged) and fear of escalation encouraged
imposition of considerable restraints on the U.S. application of force.
Moreover, by the early 1970s the war and U.S. and South Vietnamese
military and paciﬁcation initiatives had crippled (though not
destroyed) the original insurgency in the South.
War Aims.
A major contrast between the Vietnam and Iraq wars is the
political objectives sought. In the 1960s, the United States was the
counter-revolutionary power in Southeast Asia; it sought to preserve
the non-communist status quo in South Vietnam by containing the
expansion of Communism south of the 17th Parallel that separated
the Communist North from South Vietnam. In 2003, the United
States was the revolutionary power in the Middle East by virtue
of its proclaimed intention to democratize Iraq for the purpose of
providing an inspirational model for the rest of the Arab world. In
contrast to U.S. war aims in not only Vietnam but also in the 1991
Gulf War, containment was rejected in favor of radical regime
change. Democracy was not an issue in the Vietnam War. Rather,
the United States was prepared to tolerate an absence of democracy
in South Vietnam (and in many of its other Third World client states)
so long as it promoted policies favorable to U.S. objectives in the
Cold War.
The aim of regime preservation in the Vietnam War, which boiled
down to the related but quite different challenges of pacifying
an indigenous insurgency and coercing North Vietnam to cease
6

its military intervention in South Vietnam, required a massive
and protracted military effort against a determined and skilled
foe. In contrast, the more ambitious objective of regime change
in Iraq entailed a much smaller and shorter war to defeat Iraq’s
conventional military forces, although the abrupt and complete
collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime created a vacuum of political
power which afforded regime remnants and other anti-occupation
groups the opportunity to mount insurgent attacks on U.S. forces
and reconstruction targets.
There were other differences in war aims. The primary declared
objective of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was to disarm Iraq of its
suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Such weapons were
not an issue in the Vietnam War, which was a struggle over territory.
Additionally, the war on Iraq was justiﬁed as part of a larger war
on terrorism that was sparked by the horrendous al-Qaeda attacks
on the United States of September 11, 2001. Homeland security
from external terrorist attack was not an issue in the 1960s, though
Vietnamese Communist forces did conduct terrorist attacks against
Americans and South Vietnamese government targets in Vietnam,
including South Vietnam government ofﬁcials and U.S. civilian
personnel. Such attacks, however, were peripheral to main force
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military operations in the South.
Perhaps the most publicly repeated U.S. war aim in Vietnam was
that of maintaining the credibility of U.S. defense commitments
worldwide. As stated apocalyptically by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk,
There can be no serious debate about the fact that we have a
commitment to assist the South Vietnamese to resist aggression
from the North. . . . The integrity of the U.S. commitment is
the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that
commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would
draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly
to a catastrophic war.5

The defense of South Vietnam, argued the Johnson administration,
demonstrated the willingness of the United States to go to war on
behalf of prior declared commitments to do so; failure to defend
South Vietnam would cause other American allies to question the
credibility of the U.S. commitment to their defense. It would also
7

encourage communist advances elsewhere in the Third World;
indeed, abandoning South Vietnam would, it was argued, have a
“domino” effect in the rest of Southeast Asia, with the Communists
toppling one government after the other in the region.
The credibility of U.S. defense commitments worldwide was not
an issue in 2003. The Communist threat that gave rise to U.S. Cold
War alliance system had all but disappeared, and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM was not a response to Iraqi aggression. On the contrary,
it was a preventive war designed to forestall what was believed to be
Iraq’s eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons and the expansion of
a perceived Iraqi biological weapons capability. That said, the war
did serve the purpose of demonstrating U.S. willingness to use force
on behalf of a newly proclaimed security doctrine that embraced the
principle of anticipatory military action against nuclear weaponsaspiring rogue states seeking a deterrent against future American
military intervention against themselves.
Nature, Duration, and Scale of the War.
The American phase of the Vietnam War6 began as a rural,
peasant-based, materially self-sustaining Communist insurgency
in the South waged by the National Liberation Front (NLF) against
U.S.-supported South Vietnamese governmental infrastructure and
security forces, and ended up primarily as a conventional military
clash between U.S. and North Vietnamese regular forces (the
People’s Army of Vietnam, or PAVN). In contrast, Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM began as an overwhelming U.S. conventional military
operation that quickly crushed Iraq’s regular forces and ended up as
counterinsurgent campaign against Ba’athist regime remnants and
their terrorist allies.
In Vietnam, the Communists waged a classic, centrally-directed,
three-stage Maoist-model revolutionary war complete with territorial
sanctuaries and a detailed political and economic program designed
to mobilize peasant support. The Communists had a perfected
strategy of revolutionary war, well-indoctrinated and –trained troops
and political cadre, and a wealth of revolutionary war experience
in the French-Indochinese War (1946-54). The Communist war in
Vietnam also enjoyed critical external assistance.
The insurgency in Iraq bears little resemblance to this model.
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Largely urban-based and relatively small in number, the Iraqi
insurgents appear to be a mélange of former Ba’athist regime
operatives, sympathetic Sunni Arabs (including disbanded Iraqi
military ofﬁcers and soldiers), al-Qaeda and other Islamist suicide
bombers, hired gunmen and more recently militant anti-American
Shi’ites. As such, the insurgency does not seem to be centrally
directed the way the Vietnamese Communists were. The insurgency
also has no declared agenda--a function probably of its disparate
composition, though implicit in the targets of insurgent attacks is
the aim of driving the United States out of Iraq and destabilizing
the country, perhaps on behalf of a restoration of Sunni Arab rule.
Indeed, until very recently, the Iraqi insurgency rested mainly on
the minority Sunni Arab community, whose members account for
only 20-25 percent of the population (the remainder being Kurds
and Shi’ite Arabs). Now the insurgency has expanded (at least
temporarily) to include militant Shi’ites, but the Iraq situation still
stands in stark contrast to Vietnam where a class--the peasantry,
comprising 80 percent of the total population in 1965--formed the
indigenous manpower pool from which the Communist insurgency
recruited its forces.
In terms of duration of conﬂict, there is also--so far--no similarity
between the Iraq and Vietnam wars. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
was initiated in March 2003, and U.S. counterinsurgency operations
continue as of this writing (mid-April 2004). In Indochina, U.S.supported and -advised South Vietnamese counterinsurgency
operations began in the early 1960s and steadily expanded throughout
the decade. In 1965 the United States initiated a sustained air war
against North Vietnam and began introducing major ground combat
units into South Vietnam. The United States continued to conduct
military operations in Indochina until January 1973, when it signed
the Paris Peace Accord formally terminating further U.S. combat
participation. Thus, for the United States the major combat phase of
the Vietnam War lasted eight years (1965 through 1972).
The disparity between the two wars is even greater when it comes
to scale. There is simply no comparison in forces committed and
losses sustained. In terms of the former, U.S. military personnel
deployed in South Vietnam peaked at 543,000 in April 1969; this force
included nine U.S. Army and Marine Corps divisions plus selected
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subdivisional combat units. An additional 87,000 U.S. military
personnel in Southeast Asia outside Vietnam supported in-country
forces. Third country allied forces (supplied by Australia, South
Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand), including
two South Korean divisions, deployed in South Vietnam peaked in
late 1968 at 65,000 troops. In that same year, the South Vietnamese
armed forces ﬁelded 820,000 troops (a number that grew to over one
million by 1972).7
Communist troops in the Vietnam War, including regular PAVN
personnel in the North and South and NLF (also known as Viet Cong,
or VC) personnel in the South, numbered 300,000 in 1963, 700,000 in
1966, and almost one million in 1973.8 On the eve of the strategically
decisive Tet Offensive of 1968, Communist troops in South Vietnam
alone, excluding self-defense militia, other part-time paramilitary,
and political cadre, numbered between 250,000 and 300,000, of which
84-85,000 conducted the offensive (losing in the process 45-54,000
dead).9 By comparison, the enemy in Iraq is numerically small, with
insurgent Sunni Arab ﬁghters estimated at no more than 5,000, not
counting individuals performing noncombat tasks and passive and
active political sympathizers.10 Militant Shi’ites, both formally and
loosely associated with the Muqtada al-Sadr movement and his
Mahdi Army, may on the other hand number up to at least a few
thousand ﬁghters. It is unclear if this force will be able to exploit its
conﬂict with coalition forces to increase its numbers or instead will
be wiped out as a result of its challenge to the coaltion.
The Vietnam War, unlike the Iraq War, also had a huge and
protracted aerial bombing component. Indeed, air operations in
Indochina consumed about one-half of all U.S. war expenditure and
consisted of sustained land- and sea-based bombing operations in
South Vietnam, over Laos, and against North Vietnam. From 1962 to
1973, the U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft ﬂew a total of almost 550,000
combat sorties in South Vietnam alone.11 In terms of bomb tonnage
dropped, it was the largest air war in history. During the 1962-73
period, tonnage dropped throughout Indochina totaled almost
8,000,000 tons, compared to the 1,235,000 tons dropped by AngloAmerican bomber forces in the European theater during World War
II.12 (Additionally, U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam expended
almost 7,000,000 tons of munitions compared to 3,600,000 in World
War II.13)
10

U.S. aircraft and air crew losses due to hostile action and accidents,
though not in the same league as World War II, were also staggering,
in large part because of North Vietnam’s robust and technologically
sophisticated Soviet-supplied air defenses and the unusual
vulnerability of helicopters in South Vietnam’s tactical settings.
From 1962 to 1973, theater-wide U.S. aircraft losses, including
helicopters, totaled 8,588, including 2,251 ﬁxed-wing planes, and
2,700 airmen killed in action, not including helicopter crews; another
1,800 airmen were captured and became prisoners-of-war in North
Vietnam.14
In Iraq, U.S. air power comprised a large component of the initial
phase of major combat operations and enjoyed two great advantages
over U.S. air operations against Vietnam: an enemy that lacked a
functioning air force and effective air defenses, and the availability
of plentiful quantities of precision strike munitions that maximized
air-to-ground effectiveness at minimal human and political cost in
collateral damage. As in Vietnam, however, helicopters proved
vulnerable to small arms, machine guns, and hand-held missile
and grenade launchers. During the major combat phase of the war
(March 20-May 1), Iraqi gunﬁre downed one Apache helicopter (its
two-man crew was captured) and struck another 30 helicopters. In
a March 24 encounter near Karbala, Iraqi ﬁre prompted the ordered
withdrawal of elements of the 11th Aviation Regiment.15
So far, during the insurgent phase of the war, enemy ﬁre and
accidents have claimed a total of eight U.S. helicopters, and shoulderﬁred surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have damaged three ﬁxed-wing
transport aircraft.16 Helicopter losses are likely to continue and could
increase because Iraqi reliance on roadside bomb attacks encourages
greater U.S. reliance on helicopters; rocket-propelled grenades
are ubiquitous in Iraq; and it is believed that insurgent forces are
acquiring advanced SA-16 and even SA-18 missile systems.17
U.S. Manpower Loss Rates.
During the 8 years of major U.S. combat operations in the Vietnam
War--1965 through 1972, the United States suffered a total of 55,750
dead and 292,000 wounded, which translate into loss rates of 6,968
dead/36,600 wounded per year, 134/703 per week, and 19/100 per
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day.18 These loss rates are well below those sustained in World War
I (108 dead per day), World War II (305 per day), and the Korean
War (48 dead per day), but considerably above those of the 1991
Gulf War (7 dead per day) and--so far--Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
and its aftermath (in ﬂux at about 1.5 - 2.0 per day at the time of this
writing).19
On May 1, when President George W. Bush declared the
termination of major U.S. combat operations, U.S. military forces
had suffered a total of 138 battle and nonbattle deaths in Iraq.20
These losses were later eclipsed by post-May 1, 2003, casualties. By
mid-April 2004, U.S. casualties had reached 685 dead and over 3,000
wounded.21
The issue is whether these losses in Iraq are politically sustainable
over time, a subject discussed below. In the Vietnam War, the Tet
Offensive, although a major military setback for the Communists,
undermined conﬁdence within the Johnson administration that
the enemy could be defeated soon and at an acceptable cost in
American blood. Accordingly, the administration and its Nixon
administration successor halted additional force deployments to
Vietnam, entered into negotiations with the Communists, dropped
insistence on withdrawal of North Vietnamese from South Vietnam
as a component of a peace settlement, and began a series of unilateral
U.S. troop withdrawals to reduce American casualties in Vietnam,
which dropped dramatically from 1969 on.
The Enemy.
The enemy in the Vietnam War was numerically impressive, but
then so too were peak-strength U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.
Indeed, taken together, U.S., South Vietnamese, and third-country
allied forces considerably outnumbered Communist forces. U.S.
forces also enjoyed, as they did in 2003 in Iraq, an immense ﬁrepower
advantage over the enemy. In the end, however, the United States
abandoned South Vietnam to the Communists. Why?
The conventional explanation for U.S. defeat is that it was selfinﬂicted by some combination of civilian intrusion on U.S. military
operations, a hostile media, and a large domestic anti-war movement.
This judgment is not necessarily wrong as it is incomplete. For one
thing, it ignores shortcomings in the U.S. military’s performance
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within the political limitations imposed on the employment of force.
More importantly, it ignores the enemy’s performance; after all, the
Sioux had something to do with General George Armstrong Custer’s
destruction along the Little Big Horn.22
A key to understanding the outcome of the Vietnam War as well
as the outcome of many other conﬂicts in which the objectively
weaker side prevails over the stronger (e.g., the American War of
Independence, the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon, the FrenchIndochinese War, the Soviet war in Afghanistan) is asymmetry of
stakes.23 If the Vietnamese conﬂict was a limited war for the United
States, it was a total war for the Vietnamese Communists; and if
the United States curbed the employment of its military power in
Indochina, it grossly underestimated the “ﬁghting power” (as Israeli
military historian Martin van Creveld has used the term24) of the
Communists, especially their willingness to die. Because the war
was about national reuniﬁcation, independence, and who would
govern Vietnam, it could never have been remotely as important
to the United States as it was to those Vietnamese who had been
ﬁghting since 1946 to rid Vietnam of foreign rule and inﬂuence. And
nowhere was the Communists’ superior will to prevail more evident
than in the astounding casualties they were prepared to--and did-incur.
In April 1995 the government in Hanoi announced that
Communist forces during the “American period” of the Vietnam
War had sustained a loss of 1,100,000 dead, a ﬁgure that presumably
included the Communists’ 300,000 missing in action. (Hanoi also
estimated 2,000,000 civilian dead.)25 The military dead represented 5
percent of the Communist population base during the Vietnam War
of 20,000,000 (16,000,000 in North Vietnam and 4,000,000 in those
areas of South Vietnam effectively controlled by the Communists).
No other major belligerent in a 20th century war sustained such a
high military death toll proportional to its population.26 Another
way of putting the 5 percent loss in perspective: it would equal
about 15 million dead from the current U.S. population of almost
300,000,000. (The 600,000 total military dead in the American Civil
War, by far the deadliest of all of America’s wars, represented but 1.9
percent of the nation’s 1860 population of 31,000,000.)27
Richard K. Betts comments on the effects of the “fundamental
asymmetry on national interests” at stake in Vietnam:
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The Vietnamese Communists were ﬁghting for their country
as well as their principles, while the Americans had only
principles at stake--and as the antiwar case became steadily
more persuasive, even those principles were discredited. The
only possibility for decisive victory for the United States lay
in the complete obliteration of North Vietnam, an alternative
unthinkably barbaric, unimaginably dangerous, and pointless.
Hanoi bent but never broke because it preferred endless war to
defeat; Washington bent and ﬁnally did break because the public
preferred defeat to endless war.28

The insurgent enemy in Iraq is smaller in number, less
ideologically and organizationally cohesive, and has no counterpart
to North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Sunni
Arab-based portion of the insurgency appeared tough but militarily
manageable by U.S. and growing Iraqi security forces prior to Shi’ite
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s uprising which, at the time of this writing,
appears worrisome but has not actually proven its staying power.
Most insurgencies fail, especially if denied external assistance. That
said, the insurgency’s manageability could dramatically change if
signiﬁcant segments of Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population rally to
radical elements within their community and take up arms against
U.S. forces. The April 2004 uprising of politically radicalized Shi’ites
in Baghad, Kufa, Najaf, and other cities in southern Iraq killed
dozens of U.S. troops and now threatens to open a Shi’ite front in
what until then had been a primarily Sunni-based insurgency.29
In the early stages of the Iraqi insurgency, the most important and
dangerous enemy elements were clearly Ba’athist regime remnants
apparently ﬁghting to restore some semblance of the old Saddamist
order. The enemy’s identity has since seemed to be changing with
the increasing appearance of anti-American Islamic militants in
the struggle with coalition forces and their Iraqi collaborators.
In January 2004 the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Deputy
Director claimed that over 90 percent of the insurgents were
Ba’ath Party loyalists, with the remainder being jihadists.30 This
judgment was probably true at the time, though since then the
jihadist component seems to have grown relative to the Ba’athist
component. In a February 12 interview, Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, stated that religious
extremists and foreign ﬁghters were beginning to supplant Ba’athist
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remnants as the primary members of the insurgency, a judgment
seemingly validated by growing insurgent use of suicide and other
types of bombings.31 The Ba’athists and the Islamists may also be
working to establish a level of operational cooperation that would
make both groups more effective in opposing the coalition and its
Iraqi collaborators.
The leadership of Iraq’s insurgency remains unclear. Certainly
there is no Iraqi insurgent equivalent of the charismatic Ho Chi Minh
or the military mastermind Vo Nguyen Giap. The insurgency’s
continuation after Saddam Hussein’s capture on December 13, 2003,
strongly suggests that he was not playing a major role in its direction
before then, notwithstanding the periodic release of audiotapes of
Saddam calling upon Iraqis to wage a holy war against coalition
forces.
Insurgent groups associated with the Ba’athists include the Return
Party and Mohammed’s Army. The former is known for mounting
attacks on U.S. forces and distributing leaﬂets warning Iraqis not
to cooperate with U.S. authorities. Mohammed’s Army is a group
apparently composed of former Iraqi intelligence and security
agents; it has also attacked U.S. forces and issued leaﬂets vowing
to take over cities vacated by coalition forces.32 Additionally, an
unknown number of criminals and unemployed former soldiers
have been hired by the Ba’athists to engage in attacks on coalition
forces for pay.
The Ba’athist insurgents may also have a large number of
sympathizers and potential recruits among the Sunni Arab
community in Iraq. Despite Saddam Hussein’s abysmal record on
human rights, many Sunni Arabs regarded him as a strong protector
of their community, and even those Sunni Arabs who disliked
Saddam have the least to gain from a genuinely democratic Iraq in
which the country’s Shi’ite majority, long the victim of Sunni Arab
persecution, would exercise political power commensurate with its
numbers. Moreover, high unemployment in the Sunni Arab areas,
resentment over U.S. raids, the nature and scope of de-Ba’athiﬁcation,
and a lack of non-Ba’athist Sunni Arab leadership (except tribal
chieftains) all contribute to potential Sunni Arab sympathy with the
insurgents.33
If the Ba’athists still account for most insurgent ﬁghters, the
Islamists and foreign ﬁghters may be the most threatening for Iraq’s
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future. Saddam Hussein’s overthrow brought foreign terrorists into
Iraq and gave them a freedom of movement that was previously
unthinkable. Under Saddam’s regime, a pervasive and effective
internal security apparatus blocked any serious insurgent activity,
and 8 years of war with the Islamic Republic of Iran eliminated any
potential sympathy Saddam might have had for Islamic extremists
no matter how anti-American they might be. Moreover, some of
Saddam’s most dedicated domestic enemies were Islamic radicals
who engaged in anti-regime terrorism.
Foreign ﬁghters are currently entering Iraq from Syria and Iran,
countries that have been historic rivals. They are also believed to
have inﬁltrated from Saudi Arabia, while some have traveled from
Yemen. Their numbers are uncertain. Most estimates by U.S. ofﬁcials
suggest that in early 2004 there were fewer than 1,000, with less than
10 inﬁltrating per day, though some Iraqi ofﬁcials reportedly believe
the total inside Iraq could be as high as several thousand.34 The
quality of foreign ﬁghters appears to vary substantially from skilled
hard-core jihadists to restless and untrained youths.
The best known Islamist terrorist group in the country is Ansar
al Islam (Partisans of Islam), which is predominately a Kurdish
organization of limited appeal to Arab Iraqis, including Islamists.
Ansar developed and ﬂourished during the last years of Saddam
Hussein’s rule in the areas of Iraqi Kurdistan along the Iranian
border that were beyond the regime’s control. Before the Iraq War,
Ansar was widely believed to have links to al Qaeda and to Iranian
intelligence services. Saddam Hussein’s intelligence agents were
sometimes also linked to Ansar as part of Saddam’s periodic efforts
to play off Kurdish groups against one another.35
Ansar al Islam has grown stronger since Saddam’s fall. According
to Coalition Authority Administrator Paul Bremer, hundreds of
Ansar ﬁghters returned from exile in Iran, and Ansar may be willing
to put aside its conﬂict with the Ba’ath in order to strike U.S. forces.36
It is also a natural ally for any al Qaeda operatives in Iraq.
In addition to Ansar, al Qaeda is sometimes described as having
a signiﬁcant presence in Iraq, taking advantage of the political and
security vacuum created by the abrupt and utter disintegration of
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Evidence of this presence is scattered
but highly plausible. Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born
terrorist leader with suspected strong ties to al Qaeda operatives,
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is believed to be in Iraq and is the leading suspect in all of the
major suicide bombings that have been conducted in that country.37
Indeed, the ongoing effectiveness of suicide and other large-scale
bombings is often viewed as strong evidence of al Qaeda or its
afﬁliates conducting operations in Iraq. These attacks have targeted
the Jordanian embassy, UN headquarters, Kurdish political parties,
and recruiting centers for new Iraqi army and police recruits. None
of these targets, however, are exclusively enemies of al Qaeda,
and in some cases there are more likely enemies for such attacks.
Nevertheless, the techniques of attack suggest Islamic extremists or
those inspired by them.
An often overlooked insurgent component consists of individuals
who seek personal revenge against occupation forces for previous
actions against themselves or their families; anecdotal information
from Iraq suggests that a number of insurgents fall into this
category.38 They may be individuals who lost family, including
soldiers in the war itself, or individuals offended by U.S. troops
during the occupation. The blood vendettas of the Arabs often are
completely unforgiving in these circumstances.
Whatever their origins or motivations, it is also clear that Iraqi
insurgent forces are nowhere nearly as capable as the Vietnamese
Communists of the 1960s and early 1970s. Iraqi ﬁghters often
seem to favor soft targets, whereas the Vietnamese Communists
were willing to take on large U.S. Army and Marine Corps combat
units. The Communists were also organized into regimental- and
divisional-size units, whereas Iraqi ﬁghters seem to operate in
groups no larger than squads. The Communists in South Vietnam
also had large-scale external access to increasing quantities of ever
more sophisticated weaponry that the Iraqi insurgents can only
dream of. That said, the Iraqi insurgents are better armed today than
were Communist insurgents in South Vietnam in the early 1960s,
who at that time were compelled to rely largely on stolen, captured,
and home-made weapons. As under Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains
a heavily-armed society with weapons and ammunition available in
abundance throughout the country.
Finally, unlike the Vietnamese Communists, the Iraqi insurgents
have no apparent unifying ideology, strategy, or vision of a future
Iraq. Their operations often appear decentralized and uncoordinated,
and if they share the objective of forcing the Americans out of Iraq,
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it remains unclear that they have an agreed-upon strategy for doing
so. Simply kill enough U.S. troops to undercut domestic American
political support for a continued military presence in Iraq? Terrorize
Iraqis away from cooperating in Iraq’s political reconstruction?
Foment a chaotic civil war in Iraq (complete with Iranian and
perhaps Turkish intervention) beyond U.S. ability to control?
Military Operations.
In Vietnam, the United States waged two parallel albeit
overlapping wars: an attritional ground war in the South and a
coercive air war against the North. Both ultimately failed.
In the South, the U.S. Military Command, Vietnam (MACV),
concluded that prohibition of ground force operations in Laos and
across the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone left it no alternative to
waging a war of attrition against Communist forces inside South
Vietnam itself. The MACV believed that American ﬁrepower could
inﬂict intolerable casualties on the Communists, that it could force the
enemy beyond a “cross-over point” or “breaking point” at which he
could no longer replace his losses. The strategy, however, ignored the
Communists’ demonstrated tenacity and capacity for sacriﬁce as well
as their substantial manpower pool. More importantly, the strategy
mistakenly assumed that U.S. forces would have the initiative, more
often than not forcing the enemy to ﬁght on U.S. terms. In fact, it was
the Communists, not the Americans, who initiated 70-80 percent of
all ﬁreﬁghts, which meant that they could control their losses by,
among other things, refusing combat altogether when it suited them
to do so.39 Observed Douglas Blaufarb:
By and large, then--and this is the essence of the [VC/PAVN’s]
ability to survive in the teeth of American superiority--the enemy
was able to control the pace and scope of combat and thus the
level of combat losses by evading contact when it did not suit
his purpose. By this means, he managed to keep losses within
his capacity to replace them, even despite the length of his
supply and replacement lines and his lack of mobility and heavy
ﬁrepower. Generally alerted in advance to American intentions,
he avoided battle until he was ready. To him, losses--at least up to
a high level never actually reached--did not matter, terrain did not
matter. What mattered was to keep the force in being, its morale
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high, and its minimum supply requirements assured—and to
exact a price from the Americans which in the long run would be
felt painfully.40

Counting enemy bodies on the battleﬁeld (even had the process
not been corrupted) thus counted for nothing as a measure of
strategic success as long as those bodies were replaceable.
To be sure, the Communists incurred terrible losses when, as in
their Tet Offensive of 1968 and Easter Offensive of 1972, they tried
to take and hold ﬁxed positions against U.S. ﬁrepower. But this
behavior was exceptional. At no time did the MACV come close
to pushing the Communists to their manpower breaking point.
On the contrary, it was the Communists who forced to Americans
to their manpower breaking point; by 1968, additional U.S. force
deployments would have necessitated a massive Reserve call-up,
which President Johnson refused to contemplate.
The attrition strategy and its attendant search for high body
counts also encouraged a less than discriminating employment
of ﬁrepower in Vietnam’s rural areas that produced substantial
levels of collateral damage that hardly endeared the peasantry to
the South Vietnamese government. Much of the countryside was
destroyed or otherwise rendered untenable, creating a burgeoning
ﬂow of refugees to urban areas where they found little in the way
of housing or gainful employment. Precision-guided weapons were
then in their infancy, to be sure; that said, however, the elevation of
the body-count as the sole measure of battleﬁeld success offered no
incentive to be discriminating.
The air war against North Vietnam also rested on an
underestimation of Hanoi’s will to win and capacity to absorb
punishment. As a pre-industrial totalitarian state, North Vietnam
was a poor candidate for defeat through air power. It was also,
thanks largely to Soviet advice and generous military assistance,
capable of imposing signiﬁcant costs on attacking American aircraft.
Unlike Iraq in 2003, North Vietnam had a small but effective ﬁghter
interceptor force, a powerful and integrated air defense system, and
a signiﬁcant capacity for rapid bomb damage repair--especially of
its critical railroad network. Hanoi also proﬁted from repeated
U.S. bombing pauses undertaken for diplomatic reasons and, with
respect to Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-68), a gradualist
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application of U.S. air power that permitted North Vietnam to adapt
its defenses and tactics. U.S. air losses in North Vietnam totaled 925
ﬁxed-wing aircraft from 1966 through early 1973.41
Factors other than the enemy and political constraints on the
use of force adversely affected U.S. military performance. Aside
from the inherent limitations of American conventional military
power in the revolutionary war setting of Indochina, there was no
uniﬁed command of the war. Goldwater-Nichols was 20 years in
the future. There was no joint warfare in Vietnam; on the contrary,
inter-service rivalry dominated, producing disunity of command
and precluding the provision of timely and useful military advice to
civilian authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were joint in name only;
they served up conﬂicting advice, lowest-common-denominator
advice, or no advice at all. H. R. McMaster comments on the crucial
decisionmaking period of mid-1964 to mid-1965:
[E]ach of the services, rather than attempt to determine the true
nature of the war and the source of the insurgency in South
Vietnam, assumed that it alone had the capacity to win the war. The
Air Force believed that bombing North Vietnam and interdicting
inﬁltration routes could solve the problem of insurgency in the
South. . . . The Army viewed increased American involvement
in Vietnam in the context of a protracted commitment of ground
forces and believed that bombing the North might intensify the
war in the South. . . . [The Marines] advocate[d] bombing as only
the ﬁrst step in a larger program that included the introduction of
large numbers of Marines into South Vietnam to establish secure
“enclaves” along the coast.42

Service parochialism was especially pronounced in the
organization and conduct of air operations. Air operations in
Indochina were fragmented across four commands: the Strategic
Air Command (Omaha, Nebraska), 7th Air Force (Saigon), the
Paciﬁc Command (Honolulu), and 13th Air Force (Philippines).
Additionally, the U.S. ambassador in Laos exercised a veto over any
proposed air operations in that country. Air operations against North
Vietnam were divvied up into seven “route packages,” three farmed
out to the Air Force and four to the Navy.43 After the war, former
7th Air Force Commander William Momyer conceded that the route
package system “compartmentalized our air power and reduced
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its capabilities and inevitably prevented a uniﬁed concentrated air
effort.”44 Henry Kissinger concluded that the “bizarre way the air
campaign was organized throughout the war told more about the
Pentagon’s bureaucracy than about military realities; indeed, it
showed that Washington’s organizational requirements overrode
strategy.”45
The MACV’s manpower policies were no less debilitating to
military effectiveness on the ground. Rotational tours of duty
of 1 year for enlisted personnel and 3-6 months for ofﬁcers,
though important to morale (especially to conscripted and draftinduced “volunteers”), sapped small unit cohesion under ﬁre and
compromised the ability of ofﬁcers and men alike to accumulate and
sustain knowledge of and skill in ﬁghting the strange war in which
Americans found themselves in Vietnam. “In and out like clockwork
. . . just long enough to ﬁgure out what they didn’t know,” observed
combat veteran David Hackworth.46 Westmoreland’s concern for
troop morale and his reliance on massive ﬁrepower to “attrit” the
enemy also fostered very high ratios of support to combat troops,
which undermined the potential military productivity of the halfmillion troops he was granted to ﬁght the war. For considerations of
morale, huge base camp facilities were constructed, complete with
movie theaters, swimming pools, snack shops, ice cream factories,
slot machines, steam baths, baseball diamonds, post ofﬁces, and
lawns. To maximize ﬁrepower and supporting logistics, the MACV
authorized construction in South Vietnam of seven jet-capable
and 75 smaller airﬁelds, six deep water ports, and dozens of huge
warehouse complexes.47
The result was that, by 1968, no more than 80,000--or 15 percent-of the 536,000 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam were actually
available for sustained ground combat operations; indeed, less than
10 percent of the total of 2,800,000 Americans who served in what
was ﬁrst and foremost an infantry war served in line infantry units.48
Given the high fat content of U.S. forces and the relatively low
tail-to-teeth ratio of the Communist side, the MACV was probably
outnumbered in effective soldiers. Communist forces were leaner
because they relied more on stealth and cunning than ﬁrepower,
and because they recruited hundreds of thousands of peasant
coolies to perform logistical tasks. They also lived in the ﬁeld,
as had U.S. forces in World War II and Korea. Bruce Palmer, Jr.,
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one of Westmoreland’s deputies, believed the base-camp idea was
even worse than the 1-year tour for enlisted men: “The manpower
it soaked up was appalling, not to mention the waste of material
resources and the handicap of having to defend and take care of
these albatrosses.”49
The Vietnamese Communists, for their part, brought to the
battleﬁeld not only a superior will, but also a strategy dictated by
their materiel inferiority and dedicated to exploiting the Americans’
inferior will. Revolutionary war as they practiced it was a weapon
for the seizure of political power from a militarily superior foe; it
was designed for insurgent groups in pre-industrial states seeking
to overthrow foreign rule or neocolonial governments.
Vietnamese revolutionary war, which drew heavily on Chinese
Communist theory and practice, combined mass political
mobilization of the peasantry and a reliance on guerrilla tactics that
deprived a ﬁrepower superior conventional foe of decisive targets to
shoot at. The keys to success were elusiveness and protraction. The
presence of a ﬁrepower-superior enemy mandated refusal to present
decisive targets, which in turn dictated avoidance of pitched battles,
heavy reliance on camouﬂage and night operations, hit-and-run
attacks, and use of terrain and populations as means of concealment.
The fact that Communist forces sometimes violated these tactics to
their great loss simply underscores their effectiveness. Nor does
the Communists’ turn to primary reliance on conventional military
operations in the early 1970s invalidate the utility of revolutionary
war as a weapon against the Americans. Communist revolutionary
war doctrine anticipated such operations in the ﬁnal stage of
conﬂict. More to the point, the purpose of pre-conventional military
operations was to weaken the enemy’s will through protraction
of hostilities, which is exactly what the Communists succeeded in
doing during the 3 years of major combat operations culminating in
the Tet Offensive.
Protraction essentially pitted time against American materiel
superiority. Protraction played, as it had against the French in
the First Indochina War, to the inherent impatience of Western
democracies with costly and seemingly interminable wars waged
on behalf of interests ultimately regarded as less compelling than
those at stake for Vietnamese Communism. For the Communists,
there was no alternative to protraction because a swift victory over
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the Americans was impossible. Protraction was thus both politically
and militarily imperative. And it worked.
In Iraq, the U.S. leadership did not seem to expect protracted
irregular warfare beyond the termination of major combat
operations. As liberator of all Iraqis from a brutal tyranny, U.S.
forces, it was widely believed, would be as welcomed in Iraq as had
been Anglo-American and Free French forces in France in 1944.50
Some argue that the prospect of guerrilla warfare was dismissed
because, among other things, it raised the prospect of a Vietnam-like
quagmire. Frank ofﬁcial discussion of possible intractable postwar
political and military challenges in Iraq would have impeded efforts
to mobilize public support for going to war.
Insurgent attacks in Iraq have been directed at a variety of targets,
including U.S. and coalition troops, American civilian contractors,
Iraqis working with Americans, and oil and electrical power
infrastructure. Moreover, just as the Viet Cong targeted South
Vietnamese government ofﬁcials in the 1960s, Iraqi insurgents have
attacked members of the Interim Governing Council (assassinating
two of them at the time of this writing), mayors and other local Iraqi
politicians, police stations and police ofﬁcers, and members of the
New Iraqi Army and other security forces.
Insurgent tactics have evolved over time as the various groups
have engaged in trial and error. They include ambushes with small
arms and especially rocket-propelled grenades, use of improvised
explosive devises (IEDs), shoot-and-scoot mortar attacks, and vehicle
and other types of bombings. IEDs are the weapons most frequently
used against U.S. and coalition forces, while car bombs are more
often directed against softer targets, including New Iraqi Army
and police force units and individuals. As of early February 2004,
almost 400 IEDs were reported to have exploded near U.S. convoys
traveling Iraqi roads, and more than 2,500 had been discovered and
disarmed. Many IEDs are mortar and artillery shells, some of them
strung together, and most are very well-camouﬂaged.51
Iraqi police ofﬁcers and other security forces are special targets
because they are viewed as successors to eventually withdrawn
U.S. forces. They are also more vulnerable because they carry less
lethal weaponry than U.S. troops, suffer tactical communications
difﬁculties, receive limited and hasty training in force protection,
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and often lack body armor and even lightly armored vehicles.
Translators and even laundresses working for Americans are also
targeted for the purpose of deterring other Iraqis from serving the
Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. forces.52
Paciﬁcation.
One of the ironies of the Vietnam War is that the original southernrooted insurgency that prompted U.S. military intervention in
the ﬁrst place was signiﬁcantly paciﬁed--though by no means
extirpated--by the time the last major U.S. ground combat forces
departed South Vietnam. The magnitude and destructiveness
of U.S. intervention imposed manpower losses upon NLF forces
that were unsustainable without increased assistance from regular
PAVN forces. The turning point was the 1968 Tet Offensive, which
was conducted primarily by NLF forces with PAVN units held in
reserve (except at Khe Sanh). The NLF incurred horrendous losses
taking and attempting to hold towns and cities against massive U.S.
ﬁrepower delivered with perfunctory regard for avoiding collateral
damage. During the half-decade separating the Tet Offensive and
the fall of Saigon, PAVN regulars--as both formed units and as
individual ﬁllers in remaining NLF formations--came to dominate
the Communist military effort. By 1972, a conﬂict that had begun as
an indigenous guerrilla war against the Saigon regime had evolved
into a conventional military contest between the U.S. and regular
North Vietnamese forces.
NLF manpower losses on behalf of a manifest military failure
not only depressed recruiting but also prompted unprecedented
defections to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) side. But the shock
of Tet alone was not enough to pacify the insurgency. Tet initially
disrupted paciﬁcation, but it also galvanized the MACV and the
GVN to undertake long-contemplated measures that crippled the
insurgency by 1973 but failed to counter the burgeoning Communist
conventional military threat. Even before the Tet Offensive, the United
States had undertaken a complete reorganization of its paciﬁcation
efforts, which had been scattered across a host of agencies, accorded
low priority, and lacked any uniﬁed strategy. In 1967, with strong
presidential backing, paciﬁcation was granted heightened priority,
and paciﬁcation activities were centralized and coordinated under
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Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
(CORDS) headed by a civilian deputy to the MACV for paciﬁcation
and administered through interagency civil-military advisory teams
at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels.53 The effect
was a major boost of resources dedicated to paciﬁcation and their
much more efﬁcient and effective administration. CORDS provided
advice, assistance, and training across virtually the entire portfolio of
normal government functions, as well as such war tasks as training
village militia and provincial paramilitary forces and funding and
advising a national program to encourage Communist defectors and
reintegrate them into society.
CORDS took advantage of the temporary political vacuum the
Tet Offensive had created in the countryside to move back into the
villages with an Accelerated Paciﬁcation Program (APC) carried
out by U.S.-advised South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development
cadre teams supported by dedicated U.S. military operations.
Beginning in November 1968 and continuing through the end of
1971, the percentage of South Vietnam’s rural population under
effective government control steadily increased, especially in the
Mekong Delta. According to perhaps the deﬁnitive assessment
of U.S. paciﬁcation efforts in South Vietnam, “the APC marked
the start of a period, roughly 1969 to early 1972, of uninterrupted
gains in population security throughout South Vietnam and further
erosion of the Viet Cong.”54
A major reason, aside from Tet losses, why the strength of VC
guerrilla units dropped from 77,000 to 25,000 during the period
January 1968 to May 197255 was the GVN’s belated decision to
mobilize fully its available manpower for military and paramilitary
service, which had the effect of drying up much of the manpower
pool from which the VC recruited.56 Making matters worse for
the guerrillas were GVN decisions to restore traditional political
autonomy to villages (taken away by the regime Ngo Dinh Diem)
and to create village militias (People’s Self Defense Forces). But
perhaps the greatest blow to the VC’s political fortunes among the
peasantry was the sweeping land reform Saigon ﬁnally enacted in
1970 (the Land to the Tiller program), which redistributed 2.5 million
acres of landlord controlled land free to approximately two-thirds
of the tenant farmers in South Vietnam (the GVN compensated the
landlords).57
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Paciﬁcation initiatives did not, however, destroy the VC’s
network of political cadre in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong
Infrastructure (VCI). Though thousands of political operatives died
in battle and though the controversial Phoenix Program targeted the
VCI, the VCI retained its structural integrity, albeit at substantially
reduced strength and quality, by recruiting and training new cadre
in South Vietnam and bringing in more from the North.58 Indeed,
one of the very negative trends in South Vietnam during the postTet years was a signiﬁcant increase in VC terrorist attacks on local
government ofﬁcials and civilians participating in government
paciﬁcation programs, with civilian casualties in 1969 and 1970
alone averaging 26,000.59
It is nevertheless fair to say that by the time the Paris Peace
Accord was signed, the Viet Cong insurgent element of the war-as opposed to PAVN’s conventional military element--had been
defeated to the point of being militarily peripheral, even irrelevant
to the war’s ﬁnal outcome, given the PAVN’s ﬁnal offensive to
come. This does not mean that South Vietnam, even had it been left
alone by North Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accord--an impossible
counterfactual if there ever was one, had already immunized itself
from an existential insurgent threat. Despite genuine land reform,
some progress toward democratic institutions, improved standards
of living, and political stability in Saigon, paciﬁcation failed to create
a genuine political community in South Vietnam60 in large measure
because it made no progress--it was not intended to--against the
GVN’s greatest weakness: rampant corruption.
Paciﬁcation in South Vietnam was directed against a classic,
peasant-based, Maoist-model insurgency; as such, paciﬁcation efforts
involved signiﬁcant nonmilitary programs and initiatives aimed at
swaying peasant loyalties away from the Communists and toward
the GVN. No such insurgency or paciﬁcation program exists in Iraq.
The mélange of disparate groups that comprise the smaller and until
recently largely Sunni Arab and urban-based insurgency in Iraq has
no national political program, makes no pretense of competing for
the loyalty of most Iraqis, and seems much less selective than the
Vietnamese Communists in the use of high-collateral damage tactics
and weaponry.
These features of the Iraqi insurgency, together with the absence
of the kind of powerful external allies the Vietnamese Communists
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enjoyed, have led to an approach to paciﬁcation emphasizing
“sticks” over “carrots” when dealing with proven supporters of
the insurgency. Because the overthrow of Saddam Hussein ended
centuries of Sunni political domination of Iraq and its predecessor
entities, and because the restoration of that dominance would be
impossible in any genuinely representative new government, there
is little in the way of political “carrots” that the Coalition Political
Authority or its Iraqi successor could offer as a means of “pacifying”
Sunni Arab hardliners. The “carrots” that can be offered center
on material aid, efforts to keep Sunni Arabs employed, and more
sweepingly a limited tolerance of Sunni militias in places such as
Baghdad that could serve as a reassurance against bullying by a
Shi’ite-dominated government.
Accordingly, U.S. forces have relied heavily on “sticks” in Sunni
Arab strongholds. In an effort to break the insurgency, those forces
have conducted numerous raids into potentially hostile areas with
the aim of arresting suspected insurgents, ﬁnding documents of
intelligence value, seizing illegal weapons and explosives--and in
so doing, crippling the insurgency’s ability to continue attacking
coalition forces and reconstruction targets.61
The success of raiding remains unclear. Suspects have been
arrested, and weapons and valuable documents seized. Raids can,
however, alienate innocent people swept up in them or offended
by the terrifying surprise intrusion of foreign troops in private
family settings. The employment of attack aircraft as a weapon of
counterinsurgency in Iraq62 certainly risks the kind of overkill that
impeded U.S. paciﬁcation efforts in South Vietnam. Additionally,
the de-Ba’athiﬁcation campaign in Iraq is widely viewed within the
Sunni community as callous and excessive, going far beyond simply
punishing the collaborators and henchmen of the Saddam Hussein
regime.63 Within the conspiracy-minded Middle East, a variety of
Iraqi Sunnis believe the United States favors a Shi’ite-dominated
Iraqi government which will be a source of ongoing repression of the
Sunni. This belief is widely held among Arab elites in neighboring
states. Necessary U.S. efforts to reassure Iraq’s Shi’ites are often
misinterpreted by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs as a policy of favoritism
toward the Shi’ites.
As in Vietnam, moreover, the United States is ﬁnding it difﬁcult
to identify reliable measures of counterinsurgent success in Iraq.
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Insurgent body counts (killed and captured) are unreliable if the
insurgency can replace its losses; the supply of suicide bombers,
for example, seems to be inexhaustible. Additionally, given the
predominantly urban setting of the Iraqi insurgency, territorial
control is a more or less meaningless measure of success.
Role of Allies.
In 1965 the United States did not bother to seek U.N. authorization
for intervention in Vietnam because of the certainty of a Soviet
veto. In 2003, the United States sought an authorizing resolution
but failed to garner even a majority among the U.N. Security
Council’s membership. Indeed, in both cases, much of the rest of the
world, including key allies, regarded U.S. military intervention as
illegitimate, wrongheaded, or both. Not a single NATO ally joined
the United States in Vietnam; on the contrary, notwithstanding the
Johnson administration’s obsession with the need for international
allies to legitimize its war in Southeast Asia, only ﬁve other states
aside from South Vietnam itself (Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) contributed combat troops
to what were then called Free World Forces in Vietnam, and of the
ﬁve, only one (South Korea) contributed a substantial force (50,000
men organized around two combat divisions).64 Moreover, the
Korean divisions were funded and equipped entirely by the United
States, and they were contributed to South Vietnam as a substitute
for the redeployment of U.S. forces from South Korea to South
Vietnam.65
In its South Vietnamese ally, however, the United States enjoyed a
signiﬁcant asset that it lacks in Iraq: large, U.S.-trained and -equipped
indigenous army and security forces capable of shouldering static
defense and para-police functions nationwide, thereby releasing
U.S. combat forces for other tasks. At its peak strength, the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), by far the largest component of
the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), which consisted
of a national regular force of 13 divisions and more than a dozen
independent elite units supplemented by separate forces maintained
at the regional and provincial levels, numbered over 1,000,000 strong,
or almost double peak-strength U.S. forces.66 South Vietnam also had
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a sizeable air force (peak strength: 39 operational squadrons) and a
navy (672 amphibious, 450 patrol, and over 300 other vessels).67
Notwithstanding the ARVN’s numerical strength, two great
weakness doomed it as a contestant against Vietnamese Communist
forces both before and after U.S. major military intervention: a venal
and professionally inferior senior ofﬁcer corps, and a poorly trained
and motivated soldiery. The United States decided to commit major
combat forces to Vietnam in 1965 precisely because the ARVN was
rapidly losing to Communist forces; a decade later, the ARVN, again
ﬁghting without assistance from U.S. combat forces, disintegrated
in the face of the Communists’ ﬁnal offensive. “Vietnamization,”
the post-Tet Offensive U.S. program to simultaneously withdraw
U.S. forces from Vietnam and expand and modernize the ARVN,
was destined to fail absent U.S. military reintervention in the war
because it assumed that the ARVN could succeed where the MACV
had failed. The ARVN nonetheless accounted for considerable
Communist dead; if the ARVN performed poorly on the offensive,
many units often fought effectively on the defensive (for example,
against the Communist Tet attacks), and its capacity for sacriﬁce was
evident in the more than 250,000 dead it sustained during the decade
leading up North Vietnam’s ﬁnal offensive.68
If America’s allies in the Vietnam War were few and unimpressive
by U.S. standards, the opposite was true for the Vietnamese
Communists.
Unlike
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, the
Communists in Vietnam had powerful and ultimately decisive allies.
Behind the NLF in the South stood North Vietnam, and behind
North Vietnam stood the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union
supplied Hanoi 5-10 million metric tons of war materiel valued,
depending on the method of calculation, between $3.6 and $11
billion (in then-year dollars); deliveries included several hundred
ﬁghter aircraft, thousands of antiaircraft guns and ﬁeld artillery
pieces, hundreds of surface-to-air missile batteries, thousands of
tanks, helicopters, and military trucks, and huge amounts of infantry
weapons and ammunition.69 The Soviets also sent thousands of
technical advisers to train the Vietnamese to operate the sophisticated
weaponry the Soviets were supplying.
For their part, the Chinese, who had provided the Vietnamese
Communists critical artillery and other materiel assistance in
the French-Indochinese War, also delivered huge quantities of
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weapons and munitions to Hanoi. Unlike the Russians, however,
the Chinese provided over 300,000 antiaircraft and engineer
troops who, in the face of escalating U.S. bombing, manned air
defense systems and constructed, reconstructed, maintained, and
defended North Vietnam’s transportation network, especially its
railroad system.70 This assistance not only released considerable
Vietnamese manpower for other military tasks but also underscored
the seriousness of Beijing’s commitment to North Vietnam, which as
we have seen was a sensitive point for President Lyndon Johnson,
if not for his successor (who sought to engage China as a potential
strategic partner against the Soviet Union).
In Iraq, as in Vietnam, the United States has sought international
support both to reduce its military burden and to enhance the
legitimacy of its policy, although it strongly resisted giving the
United Nations a major voice in postwar Iraq policy. In Iraq, as
in Vietnam, this effort produced disappointing results, although
the number and variety of countries contributing forces to Iraq’s
postwar stabilization is much more impressive than those that sent
troops to Vietnam. In both cases, the United States bore the primary
manpower burden of the ﬁghting, although in Vietnam, unlike Iraq,
a large indigenous force performed important static defense and
other military tasks.
In Iraq, invading U.S. ground forces numbered three divisions, a
brigade combat team, and various support units for a total of more
than 115,000 troops; the U.S. force presence in Iraq subsequently
peaked at about 140,000 as reinforcements arrived and the mission
shifted to stability operations. The most notable allied contribution
came from the United Kingdom, which contributed 26,000 troops;
Australia contributed an additional 2,000.71
Since the termination of major combat operations on May 1,
2003, a number of other countries, for a variety of motives, some
of them having little to do with support for U.S. policy in Iraq,
have committed limited force contingents to assist Iraq’s postwar
stabilization. Britain, not surprisingly, has maintained the largest
force contingent after the United States, with 8,200 troops in Iraq as of
March 2004.72 British-commanded multinational forces in southern
Iraq now include contingents from Italy (2,900), the Netherlands
(1,060), Denmark (545), Romania (514), the Czech Republic (271),
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Norway (129), Portugal (128), Lithuania (95), and New Zealand
(55).73
Poland, which has 2,500 troops in Iraq, commands the southcentral sector consisting of additional troops from Spain (1,300),
Ukraine (1,000), Bulgaria (650, including police), El Salvador (380),
Honduras (370), Dominican Republic (250), Nicaragua (250),
Romania (230), Philippines (178, including police and civilians),
Mongolia (171), Latvia (106), Slovakia (85), and Kazakhstan (27).74
By late February 2004, South Korea and Japan had also agreed
to send troops to Iraq. Approximately 900 Australian troops are
also deployed in and around Iraq.75 Nicaragua sent 115 troops
but withdrew them for ﬁnancial reasons. Additionally, Thailand,
Hungary, Azerbaijan, Albania, Georgia, Estonia, and Macedonia
have sent noncombat contingents ranging in size from 28 to 400
troops.76
South Korea originally contributed 675 troops, but later agreed
to provide another 3,000. These additional troops were scheduled
to deploy to the northern city of Kirkuk by the end of April and
were supposed to operate under their own command. In March
2004, however, Seoul cancelled the planned deployment to Kirkuk
because of questionable security in the area and concern that its
troops would have to participate in offensive military operations.
South Korea emphasized that it still planned to deploy these troops
in Iraq, but that the deployment was now expected to be delayed
until June, when a new site for deployment could be determined.77
The South Korean government continues to face strong domestic
opposition to its military involvement in Iraq.
Japan, another major U.S. Asian ally, has sent approximately
1,000 troops to Iraq, where they are deployed to the southern city
of Samawah in cooperation with the British and also to Baghdad
International Airport. Japanese public opinion, though initially
strongly opposed to deployment, had softened by March 2004,
though it remains unclear how the Japanese public might react to
casualties. Shintaro Ishihara, the governor of Tokyo, has stated the
he expects that casualties will generate a surge of support for the
government, although it would seem equally possible that many
Japanese would reconsider the wisdom of sending troops to Iraq.78
The political staying power of key allied troop contributors
remains uncertain, however, because their troop presence in Iraq
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generated domestic political controversy from the start. Many
democratic governments sent troops against the wishes of public
majorities back home, and domestic opposition groups have
naturally latched on to popular discontent in efforts to challenge
sitting governments. Opposition parties in Australia, Portugal, and
the Netherlands have demanded ofﬁcial inquiries into governmental
decisions to support the war, especially into what they believed
about Iraq’s WMD before the war was launched.79 In Spain, 3 days
after devastating al Qaeda bombings in Madrid that killed almost
200 people on March 11, 2004, the electorate voted into ofﬁce a new
government dedicated to withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq
and repudiating its predecessor government’s unpopular strategic
alignment with the United States. Indeed, the Madrid attacks
underscore the homeland vulnerability of states contributing forces
in Iraq and the potential political vulnerability of governments that,
in following the United States into Iraq, have bucked the wishes of
their domestic electorates.
Insurgent attacks on non-U.S. coalition forces in Iraq also may
increase domestic political pressures on governments contributing
contingents. Italian, Spanish, and Polish forces have already been
attacked by car bombers. Unilateral withdrawal of several or more
allied contingents could be a serious setback for U.S. Iraq policy
because they usually do not draw the ire that U.S. forces do and
because their contributing governments are not perceived to have
imperialist agendas in Iraq. Additionally, the more “Americanized”
the already heavily American foreign presence in Iraq becomes,
the more likely it is that it will provoke increased Iraqi nationalist
opposition. Some Iraqi nationalists may be drawn to the insurgent
cause by what they view as a prolonged U.S. troop withdrawal
and the continued absence of a new U.N. effort to take over the
establishment of a new Iraq, The United Nations, for all of its
shortcomings, has greater legitimacy in the Arab world than does
the United States.
State-Building.
The Vietnam War ended as a war between two states, the northern
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the southern Republic of
Vietnam (RVN). Ho Chi Minh declared the former state established
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in September 1945, whereas the latter state was formed in 1954 on the
basis of an antecedent French surrogate in the wake of the Geneva
Accords that concluded the French Indochinese War and mandated
the withdrawal of France from Indochina. Both states, separated by
what was supposed to be a temporary dividing line along the 17th
Parallel pending nationwide elections in 1956, claimed to be the sole
legitimate government of all of Vietnam.
The United States supported the RVN from its inception as a
bulwark against further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia;
it is fair to say that but for U.S. political sponsorship and economic
and military largesse, the anti-Communist regime of President Ngo
Dinh Diem and his successors could have been neither created
nor sustained. Indeed, the impending military collapse of South
Vietnam in 1965 prompted major U.S. combat intervention, and the
absence of that intervention a decade later doomed the U.S. Cold
War client state.
The United States embraced state-building in South Vietnam for 2
decades. It fostered, advised, and funded governmental institutions
and activities across the board; it armed and trained the RVN armed
forces (RVNAF) and security services; it ﬁnanced the RVN’s war
costs and subsidized South Vietnam’s economy; and it attempted
to guide the RVN toward adoption of democratic institutions. In the
end, however, state-building failed. Why? The obvious answer is
the RVN’s military defeat in 1975. But this begs the question of why
the RVN was defeated so quickly, surprising even the Communists,
who expected their ﬁnal offensive to take 2, even 3, years.80 Why did
the RVNAF, well-equipped and numerically strong, disintegrate in
less than 2 months, with senior ofﬁcers ﬂeeing ahead of their men?
Why did the RVNAF, which for all practical purposes was the South
Vietnamese state by virtue of its monopoly of RVN administrative
authority, fail to ﬁght effectively for the non-Communist order it
represented?
It is easy to blame United States. In the wake of the Tet Offensive,
the United States reduced its principal war aim from securing
an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam to seeking an
honorable withdrawal; it then proceeded unilaterally to withdraw
its combat troops from the ﬁght, and in 1973 signed a treaty
that barred their return while leaving the NVA undisturbed
inside South Vietnam.81 During this same period, in the name
33

of “Vietnamization,” the United States also funded the RVNAF’s
expansion and modernization well beyond the RVN’s capacity to
man and maintain it. And when the ﬁnal Communist offensive was
launched in 1975, the United States failed not only to re-enter the
war but also to provide the materiel assistance (mostly replacement
equipment, ammunition, and spare parts) Saigon desperately
requested in the wake of the ARVN’s abandonment of massive
weapons and equipment in its pell-mell retreat from the Central
Highlands.
But none of this excuses the RVN from some share--in our view,
the primary share--of responsibility for its demise. In its life-anddeath struggle with the DRV, the RVN was crippled from the start
by three main weaknesses that no amount of American intervention
could offset: professional military inferiority, rampant corruption,
and lack of political legitimacy.82 Joseph Buttinger, a renowned
scholar of Vietnamese history and society, concluded in the wake of
South Vietnam’s destruction that:
The swift and dramatic collapse of the South Vietnamese army
and the Saigon regime was not the result of an overwhelming
attack by superior military forces. It came about because of the
degree of moral disintegration the South Vietnamese army had
reached in 1975. This in turn reﬂected the degree of moral and
political decay to which South Vietnamese society had sunk after
years of increasing political terror, mass misery and corruption.
Moral disintegration alone can explain why an army three times
the size and possessing more than ﬁve times the equipment of the
enemy could be as rapidly defeated as the ARVN was between
March 10 and April 30, 1975.83

Cao Van Vien, the RVNAF’s last Chief of Staff, described a domino
doomed to fall by 1975:
South Vietnam was approaching political and economic
bankruptcy. National unity no longer existed; no one was able to
rally the people behind the national cause. Riddled by corruption
and sometimes ineptitude and dereliction, the government
hardly responded to the needs of a public which had gradually
lost conﬁdence in it. . . . Under these conditions, the South
Vietnamese social fabric gradually disintegrated, inﬂuenced in
part by mistrust, divisiveness, uncertainty, and defeatism until
the whole nation appeared to resemble a rotten fruit ready to fall
at the ﬁrst passing breeze.84
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From the RVN’s inception in 1955 until its collapse 20 years
later, its leadership failed to create a military establishment of
sufﬁcient integrity and competence to give as good as it got from
the PAVN and Viet Cong. If the RVNAF enjoyed a numerical and
ﬁrepower advantage over its Communist foe, it suffered--before,
during, and after the war’s Americanization--a decided inferiority
in the intangibles that make up genuine ﬁghting power. With some
notable exceptions, RVNAF units were poorly led and motivated,
and in great contrast to both Communist and U.S. combat forces, did
not seek contact with the enemy. The RVNAF was also, again with
notable exceptions, corrupt, from the chicken-stealing private to the
kickback-receiving province chief, and, by most accounts, thoroughly
penetrated by Communist agents.85 A 1967 State Department
assessment of the RVNAF concluded that it suffered from poor
leadership, poor morale, poor relations with the population, and
low operational capabilities including poor coordination, tactical
rigidity, overdependence on air and artillery support arising in
part from inadequate ﬁrepower, overdependence on vehicular
convoy, unwillingness to remain in the ﬁeld at night or over
adequately long periods, and lack of aggressiveness.86

The conventionality of the RVNAF’s force structure, widely
criticized as unsuited for the challenges posed by Communist
revolutionary war, probably did not really matter in the long run.
The effectiveness of any force structure hinges upon the professional
ability of its ofﬁcer corps to lead and upon the willingness of its
soldiery to be led, and the RVNAF proved fatally deﬁcient in
both respects. The RVNAF was as incapable of dealing with the
Communists’ conventional offensive of 1975 as it was with the
Communist insurgency of the early 1960s.
The sources of the RVNAF’s professional incapacity were evident
to close observers of South Vietnam’s armed forces. At the center
of that incapacity was a highly politicized and venal ofﬁcer corps
and a soldiery whose high desertion rates reﬂected at bottom an
understandable unwillingness to die for “leaders” who cared only
for themselves. Both President Ngo Dinh Diem and his military
successors elevated political loyalty over professional competence
as the key to promotion and other rewards. Key RVNAF units
were withheld from combat to protect the government from the
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ever-present threat of a coup d’etat, and generals that displayed too
much professional skill were always regarded as potential political
threats. Additionally, military promotions and such important
administrative ofﬁces as province chieftainships were more often
than not offered to the highest politically acceptable bidder. An
ambitious and politically acceptable colonel, for example, would
pay to become a province chief, a position ﬁnanced in turn by the
sale of subordinate district chieftainships and the shakedown of
local merchants.
There was also widespread theft of American military and
economic aid. Stealing became obscenely proﬁtable in a relatively
small and poor country suddenly ﬂooded with American wealth,
and it was certainly easier and much safer than ﬁghting the enemy,
which, after all, the Americans in 1965 had volunteered to take care
of anyway. Black market operations trafﬁcking in U.S. goods stolen
or bribed away from vast U.S. and RVN warehouses was a major
feature of RVNAF corruption. There was nothing that could not
be had for the right price on the teeming black market, including
U.S. arms, ammunition, military radios, and medicine. Communist
agents plied the market, especially for items, such as medicines, in
short supply among Communist ﬁeld forces. No wonder that the
professional attractiveness of combat command that was paramount
in other armies was notable for its absence in the RVNAF, where
the lure of material gain was well-nigh irresistible. The National
Military Academy in Dalat (South Vietnam’s West Point) graduated
ofﬁcers that wanted staff rather than line billets; in one 1966 class,
every graduating ofﬁcer expressed preference for assignment to a
division headquarters rather than an infantry company.87
A postwar survey of exiled South Vietnamese military ofﬁcers
and civilian leaders revealed that “corruption was considered more
than a problem that could have been solved by the ﬁring of a few
generals or civilians. It was regarded by many of the respondents
as a fundamental ill that was largely responsible for the ultimate
collapse of South Vietnam.”88 Stewart Herrington argues that
venality was so pervasive that purging the corrupt would have
“decimated the ofﬁcer corps . . . . To have attempted to cut out the
cancer would have killed the patient.”89
The ultimate corruption--and testimony to Vietnamization’s
innate futility--was spiritual: the RVNAF’s unwillingness to seek
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battle with the Communists. Vietnamization armed and trained,
but it could not create superior and combative leadership.90 The
RVNAF undoubtedly recognized the Communists’ superior ﬁghting
power which, as Anthony James Joes correctly points out, stemmed
in no small measure from (1) presentation of an attractive political
program of “expel the foreigner, give the land to the peasants, and
unite the nation,” (2) a totalitarian political system that disciplined,
controlled, and directed society far more effectively than possible
in South Vietnam, and (3) a “military doctrine and ﬁelded armed
forces well-suited to both the aims and the territory for which they
were ﬁghting.”91 The RVNAF leadership also hoped, after 1965, and
probably believed, that the Americans would win the war for them.
However, even when it became apparent that the Americans were
going to leave without having done so, the RVN, preoccupied with
politics and rotted with corruption, proved incapable of endowing
its ofﬁcer corps or soldiery with the ingredients necessary to become
competitive with the PAVN.
Lack of aggressiveness was reinforced by class antagonisms
within the RVNAF. The rank and ﬁle was drawn from the
peasantry, whereas the ofﬁcer corps was recruited almost entirely
from among the urban, educated, and socially advantaged strata of
society. A greatly disproportionate number of senior ofﬁcers were
also Catholic--in a predominately Buddhist and animist country.
(The legendary U.S. Army adviser John Paul Vann regarded these
class and other differences separating the ofﬁcer corps from the
ranks as unbridgeable and, as such, a powerful argument for U.S.
assumption of direct control of the RVNAF.92) The differences were
all too often reﬂected in ofﬁcer contempt for the common soldier
(similar to the class arrogance and callousness that separated ofﬁcer
from enlisted man in the pre-1914 British army), to which the latter
predictably responded with fear, distrust, and desertion. At no time
during the Vietnam War did South Vietnam’s senior leadership see
ﬁt to provide its troops even minimally adequate pay, dependent
housing, medical care, and rotation out of isolated and vulnerable
outpost duty. Open physical abuse of enlisted men and even junior
ofﬁcers for sins real and imagined was not uncommon.
The RVNAF’s high desertion rates93 came as no surprise, nor did
the soldiers’ propensity to supplement their meager pay through
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theft of foodstuffs from villages they entered by day but abandoned
before dark. Unlike the Communist enemy it faced, the RVNAF
lacked the two things that could have compensated for the perennial
poverty, homesickness, and fear of death common to soldiers
on both sides: superb discipline and a powerful and unifying
patriotism capable of eliciting a willingness to sacriﬁce one’s life on
behalf of a larger cause. “The South Vietnamese soldier, in the end,”
concludes Guenter Lewy, “did not feel he was part of a political
community worth the supreme sacriﬁce; he saw no reason to die for
the [government]. The country lacked a political leadership which
could inspire a sense of trust, purpose, and self-conﬁdence.”94
At bottom, the RVN was unsustainable because it failed to
achieve the measure of political legitimacy necessary to compete
with the Communists. William J. Duiker, the leading American
historian of Vietnamese Communism, argues persuasively that
the most important factor underlying the defeat of the RVN was
the Communist Party’s “successful effort to persuade millions
of Vietnamese in both North and South that it was the sole
legitimate representative of Vietnamese nationalism and national
independence.” This success was personiﬁed in the charismatic
Ho Chi Minh, whose public personality, “embodying the qualities
of virtue, integrity, dedication, and revolutionary asceticism,
transcended issues of party and ideology and came to represent . . .
the struggle for independence and self-realization of the Vietnamese
nation.”95
In Vietnam, anti-Communism was always burdened by its initial
association with detested French rule (many senior RVNAF leaders
had fought on the French side during the First Indochinese War) and
by its antipathy to the powerful Vietnamese nationalist sentiment
mobilized by Ho Chi Minh against both the French and their
American successors. Additionally, as the Americans assumed ever
greater responsibility for the anti-Communist struggle, the more
they compromised the RVN’s claim even to a pretense of national
legitimacy. The situation became acute with the Americanization of
the war beginning in 1965. The deployment of over half a million
U.S. troops to South Vietnam, observes Timothy J. Lomperis,
made it difﬁcult for the Saigon government to hold on to its
claims of traditional legitimacy, and correspondingly easy for
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the Communists to depict themselves as champions against
yet another foreign intervenor and to link themselves with all
the heroes of the past who had fought against the intrusions of
outsiders. If the Americans thought they were very different
from Frenchmen, they did not appear to be to the villagers.96

The anti-Communist side was simply noncompetitive.
What made the situation even worse was that the South
Vietnamese leaders had very few claims of their own to national
legitimacy. Although Ngo Dinh Diem was a nationalist, he did
very little to show his sentiments during the struggle against
the French. The subsequent leaders, Nguyen Cao Ky and
Nguyen Van Thieu, both served in the French armed forces;
thus, whatever sympathies they had for independence did not
come into public view. Naturally, these facts and the presence
of American troops redounded to the credit of the Communists.
They also played a useful role in deﬂecting attention from the
fundamental incompatibility between Marxism and the nature of
traditional Vietnamese legitimacy. The Communists might not
have gotten away with this if American troops had not been so
conspicuously present.97

An inescapable conclusion is that the RVN, sponsored and
sustained in the wake of what was intended to be a temporary
division of Vietnam, was little more than an artifact of U.S. Cold
War diplomacy, and in its short life failed to achieve the political
legitimacy necessary to survive without a powerful U.S. military
presence. “We are so powerful that Hanoi is simply unable to defeat
us militarily. By its own efforts, Hanoi cannot force the withdrawal
of American forces from South Vietnam,” noted Henry Kissinger
in 1969. “Unfortunately, our military strength has no political
corollary; we have been unable . . . to create a political structure that
could survive military opposition from Hanoi after we withdraw.”98
Concludes George C. Herring, the dean of American historians of
the Vietnam War:
Originally created by the French, the Saigon regime could
never overcome its origins as a puppet government. Political
fragmentation, the lack of able and farsighted leaders, and a
tired and corrupt elite which could not adjust to the revolution
that swept Vietnam after 1945 afforded a perilously weak basis
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for nationhood. Given these harsh realities, the American effort
to create a bastion of anticommunism south of the seventeenth
parallel was probably doomed from the start.99

In Iraq, as in South Vietnam, political success will require creation
of (1) a government regarded as legitimate by the great majority of
the country’s inhabitants, and (2) security forces capable of protecting
the new political order. South Vietnam had a government, albeit a
corrupt one, and large security forces, albeit professionally mediocre
ones. Politically and militarily, however, it faced an exceptionally
powerful enemy. In Iraq, the United States is starting from scratch
because no real national government and only ﬂedgling security
forces exist. Moreover, any government the United States fosters
in Iraq will be tainted in the eyes of many Iraqis by virtue of its
American association, especially if the security situation continues
to require a large and highly visible U.S. military presence. On the
other hand, Sunni Arab alienation has failed to generate a political
and military threat to state-building in Iraq remotely approaching
that posed by the Communists in Vietnam. The main threat to
state-building in Iraq lies not in the insurgency in central Iraq, but
rather in the potential for the recent uprising of Shi’ite militants to
reignite, expand, and include large elements of that community or
the development of the kind of sectarian civil war that plunged
Lebanon into near anarchy for almost 2 decades.
Prospects for creating a stable, prosperous, and democratic Iraq
are problematic, and observers and decisionmakers should not be
mislead by false analogies to American state-building success in
Germany and Japan after World War II.100 Among other things,
the United States entered Germany and Japan with overwhelming
force, precluding any postwar resistance; and in Japan, the Emperor
Hirohito himself legitimized General Douglas MacArthur’s military
rule. The United States was also able to maintain an internationally
supported military presence in Japan and Germany for years during
which democratic institutions could be created and nurtured.
In Iraq, however, the United States does not have the luxury of
time. Many Iraqis and virtually all of Iraq’s Arab neighbors view
the American military presence with profound suspicion; even those
Iraqis who fear U.S. withdrawal will spark a civil war nonetheless
distrust American motives in the region. Fueling pervasive anti40

Americanism in Iraq are regional media, especially Iranian and
Gulf Arab state-based television programs. Iraqi governmental
institutions are thus being hastily erected under extreme political
pressure and have to be adapted and restructured in response to
the objections of various Iraqi sectarian leaders, most notably Shi’ite
Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani.
That said, there is probably no feasible alternative to adherence to
the June 30, 2004, deadline for transferring sovereignty to whatever
Iraqi political entity ﬁnally is established to receive it. Many leading
Iraqi politicians have deﬂected criticism of their cooperation with
the United States by claiming that such cooperation is the best way
to encourage an early U.S. military departure and pave the way for
self-government. A signiﬁcantly delayed departure--and certainly
a perception of a permanent U.S. military presence in the making-would threaten those politicians’ credibility. Additionally, the more
the United States attempts to bolster an indigenous government
by a large and prolonged military presence, the more it is likely
to undermine that government’s legitimacy. Clear signs of a U.S.
withdrawal will defuse nationalist concern and provide Iraqi
governmental and especially security institutions some political
breathing room.
The United States nonetheless is gambling regardless of what it
does; if a prolonged military presence threatens to delegitimize the
new Iraqi government, a premature and abrupt withdrawal could
create a security vacuum encouraging disorder, even civil war.
Under even the best of circumstances, fashioning genuine
democracy in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is problematic. Since
its creation, Iraq has known nothing but authoritarian rule and,
under Saddam Hussein, a vicious neo-Stalinist tyranny. Though
Iraqi regimes, like other dictatorships, embraced such democratic
trappings as elections, parliaments, independent courts, they did so
fraudulently for purely propaganda purposes. Thus for a democratic
Iraq to work, Iraqis must accept the American claim that heretofore
fraudulent institutions have been transformed into legitimate ones
that can be trusted to deliver genuine representative government
while protecting the rights of minorities.
Iraqis also are going to have to develop the kind of political society
whereby contending individuals and groups can be elected to power
without provoking fears of an existential threat among the losers. If
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the losers believe that the winners, once in ofﬁce, will maintain power
by extra-legal means, they may seek to ensure the safety of their own
communities via resistance to national institutions and enhancing
their own sources of power (such as militias). Democracy means
different things to different communities in Iraq. To the majority
Shi’ite Arabs, democracy is often viewed solely as a majority rule,
winner-take-all system; anything less raises fear of a resurrected
Sunni Arab tyranny and has incited the expressed concerns of Shi’ite
leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani. It is not clear that the Shi’ite
leadership understands or accepts the concept of minority rights,
rule of law, and other democratic principles unrelated to majority
rule.
In Iraq, there are also questions about the current post-Saddam
institutions that were created to ease the transition to democracy.
The Iraq Governing Council (IGC) is a U.S.-appointed body
containing a number of exiles who have little or no political
standing inside Iraq and who, many Iraqis fear, can be manipulated
by foreign interests. The IGC has also run afoul of the lower-level
but more democratic councils selected with strong local support
and legitimacy, portending future conﬂict between popular local
councils and an unpopular national government. Additionally, the
IGC and other Iraqi institutions have been called upon to function
in a security environment dominated by the ever-present threat of
assassination of themselves and their families.
Problems with the IGC, however, may soon be dwarfed by
difﬁculties with a new government created under Iraq’s controversial
“Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL) or “interim Constitution”
and the still unresolved efforts to create conditions under which
elections can be held in Iraq.101 The TAL emerged only after ﬁerce
disagreement and continues to enjoy only the most conditional
support by those Iraqis who tolerate it at all.102 Key issues addressed
by the TAL but still subject to dispute include the structure of
government, the role of Islam in public life, Kurdish autonomy, and
the nature of federalism.
Under the TAL, executive power is to be concentrated in a threeperson executive council composed of a president and two deputy
presidents. The president is widely expected to be a Shi’ite Arab,
with a Sunni Arab and a Kurd serving as deputy presidents. All
three executives must agree on any policy initiative before it is
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undertaken. The unanimity rule offers the minority Sunni and
Kurdish communities some protection, but Shi’ite leaders are livid
about a system of governance which they believe cheats them of
their rightful (majoritarian) leadership of the country. Additionally,
much to the anger of the Shi’ites, the TAL grants three predominantly
Kurdish provinces the right to reject a future permanent Constitution.
According to the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the most respected Shi’ite
leader in the country, “This constitution that gives the presidency in
Iraq to a three-member council, a Kurd, a Sunni Arab, and a Shi’ite
Arab, enshrines sectarianism and ethnicity in the future political
system in the country.”103 Sistani has warned UN ofﬁcials that he
will refrain from working with them should they do anything to
bolster the legitimacy of the interim Constitution.104
Disagreements over election-related issues also have been serious.
Initial U.S. plans for regional caucuses (involving indirect elections)
to produce a transitional government were strongly opposed by the
Shi’ite religious leadership, including Sistani, and consequently had
to be cancelled. An alternative to caucuses has yet to be developed,
but the Shi’tes have made it very clear that they will not accept any
solution, including indirect elections and weighted voting, other
than “one person, one vote.”
The Kurds, however, are unlikely to accept the Shi’ite demand
for absolute majority rule because historically they were victimized
by a strong central government in Baghdad and because they
have enjoyed virtual political autonomy since the end of the Gulf
War 1991. Accordingly, the Kurds favor a weak, even paralyzed,
central government; they seek to preserve as much of their post1991 autonomy as they can, as well as to claim as much of Iraq’s
oil resources and revenues as they can for their own region. The
Kurds remain thoroughly alienated from the Iraqi state and have a
powerful sense of nationhood.105 Many young Kurds no longer even
learn Arabic in the schools in the Kurdish autonomous areas.
Sunni Arabs are likewise concerned about a new power sharing
arrangement based on majority rule. In the aftermath of the U.S. deBa’athiﬁcation campaign, Sunnis are widely reported to feel a strong
sense of uncertainty, fear, and persecution. Some assert that deBa’athiﬁcation aims to prepare the country for a Shi’ite leadership
dependent on the United States.106 Many Sunnis are certain that
the United States has given up on them and is conspiring with the
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Shi’ite Arabs to do them in politically, a view that manifestly fuels
insurgent violence against U.S. forces.
Ironically, the development of democratic institutions in Iraq is
likely to stimulate formation of political parties based on ethic and
sectarian allegiances that would simply magnify the sharp divisions
within Iraqi society. As experience in other developing countries
shows, sectarian political parties seldom have a stake in political
moderation because they appeal for support within the same
ethnic group by articulating the demands of their community at the
expense of seeking broad support on a transcommunal basis. In so
doing, they often attempt to outbid each other in their assertiveness
in claiming a larger share of political power for their own group.
In such an environment, compromising leaders can be tarred as
“sellouts” and the election of a radical party from one sectarian
community can provoke the rise of radical leadership in other
communities, thus sparking a cycle virtually guaranteed to produce
violent intercommunal confrontation and the disintegration of any
pretense of democracy.107
Even assuming success in the creation of a stable government
commanding the loyalty or at least the passive acquiescence of most
Iraqis, the new state will still need army and security forces capable
protecting it from internal and external threats. It is certainly in the
interest of the United States as well as any new Iraqi government
to transfer military and police functions now being shouldered by
the United States as quickly as feasible to indigenous institutions.
As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated, referring
to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, “foreign forces are unnatural.
They ought not to be in a country.”108 The “Iraqization” of security
functions now being performed by U.S. forces and the concomitant
withdrawal of those forces are likely to bolster the legitimacy of any
new Iraq government, provided that the new forces can operate
without extensive and visible support from U.S. troops remaining in
the country after the turnover of sovereignty to Iraqis scheduled for
June 30, 2004. The United States plans to organize, train, and equip
over 200,000 Iraqi security personnel as part of this effort.109
But those forces must be effective. The CPA’s mid-May 2003
decision, for reasons not well-explained, to disband the entire Iraqi
regular army with but a month’s pay is now widely regarded as a
mistake. According to one source:
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The dismissal of [Iraqi ofﬁcers] treated them as an extension of
Saddam and the Ba’ath’s rule . . . rather than as patriots who had
fought for their country. It also added several hundred thousand
men to the labor pool when there were virtually no jobs, and it
effectively told all ofﬁcers of the rank of colonel and above that
they had no future in a post-Saddam environment. At the same
time, it implied to all Iraqis that the new Iraq Army might be
so weak that Iraq would remain little more than a client of the
United States and Britain in the face of the threat from Iran and
possible future intervention by Turkey.110

The decision was not reversed, nor have selective recalls been
implemented; instead, the New Iraqi Army (NIA) is being created
from scratch. The New Iraqi Army is the third name given to the
force. The ﬁrst was the “New Iraqi Corps,” but the acronym for this
sounds like an Arab expletive. “Iraqi Defense Forces” was then tried
but discarded because its acronym is identical to that of the Israeli
Defense Forces.
Though the primary mission of the NIA is protection of Iraq from
external attack, as opposed to providing internal security, this mission
seems to have been set aside, at least temporarily, because of urgent
counterinsurgency requirements in the so-called Sunni triangle area.
Indeed, some NIA troops were placed in the most dangerous Sunni
areas shortly after they completed their training.111
Early planning behind the NIA rested on the apparent assumption
that Iraq could initially satisfy its security needs with a small, 40,000man army composed primarily of light infantry (compared to the
350,000-man heavy-and-light army that Iraq had at the beginning of
the war.)112 The NIA was to be created over a 3-year period, although
this schedule was subsequently reduced to 2 years because of the
ongoing lack of security in central Iraq. The new schedule calls for
an NIA of 12,000 by July 2004 and the full 40,000 by mid-2005.113 A
larger NIA is also being considered. However, the ﬁrst NIA battalion
crumbled when up to one-half of its members deserted because of
inadequate pay and risky combat assignments in the Sunni Triangle;
some said they could make better money by cooperating with the
insurgents in killing U.S. troops.114 Pay was subsequently raised and
conditions were improved.
Two other major problems with the NIA have caused yet additional
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disincentives to join it: insurgent attacks on recruiting stations, and
the NIA’s lack of all but small arms. The latter, especially given the
insurgency’s near monopoly of the tactical initiative vis-à-vis the
NIA, places the NIA at a considerable combat disadvantage.
Police units are another especially important element in the effort
to create and maintain security because their primary mission is
internal security. Not surprisingly, police force units have attracted
repeated insurgent attacks, and there are reports that the police may
have been inﬁltrated by some insurgent elements.115 By April 2004,
at least 350 Iraqi police ofﬁcers had been killed in confrontations
with insurgents.116 One estimate even suggested that the number
was 632.117 Moreover, in a disturbing April 2004 development, a
number of Iraqi police units abandoned their posts rather than resist
poorly-trained militiamen loyal to Muqtada al Sadr.118
In addition to the NIA and the police, new Iraqi security forces
include the Iraqi Border Guard (IBG), Iraqi facility protection
units, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The ICDC is
the most important of these three forces because its mission is
counterinsurgency, which it is expected to perform without the
presence of coalition forces.
The ICDC, whose necessity, like the insurgency itself, was not
anticipated before the war, was created in July 2003 in response to the
insurgency and began operations in August.119 Efforts to organize,
train, and equip the ICDC, originally designed as a temporary force
(to be disbanded once the insurgency ended), lagged behind those of
the NIA and police. As expected with any new Iraqi force, the ICDC
has a mixed record and depends heavily on U.S. advice, training, and
money, though it is considered an emerging success by CENTCOM
and Defense Department ofﬁcials.120
The Iraq Civil Defense Corps has some clear advantages within
Iraqi society. Many of its members strongly and credibly claim they
are ﬁghting for the protection of their local community and are not
supporters of either the coalition presence or the U.S.-supported
Iraqi government.121 Moreover, in many areas, especially in small
towns and rural places, Iraqis have joined the ICDC with the
approval and support of the local tribal leadership, thus legitimizing
their membership in the ICDC as well as their performance of its
counter-insurgent mission. Finally, as a local defense force, the
ICDC, whose units take only 3 weeks to train, has advantages in
gathering intelligence.
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How the Iraqi security forces stand in the eyes of the citizens
they are charged with protecting is not clear, although anecdotal
information suggests that they are dimly viewed by some clergy
and many Sunni Arabs. It is in any event difﬁcult to build new
security forces accepted as legitimate in the absence of an actual
Iraqi government regarded as such. And Iraqi security forces well
may wonder what will happen to them when U.S. forces depart. In
a worrisome potential precedent, some ICDC units deserted their
posts during the Muqtada al Sadr uprising.122
The alternatives to U.S.-sponsored security institutions in Iraq
are communal militias. If Iraqis come to lack conﬁdence in the NIA
and ICDC, they will look to such militias for protection. Though
the United States rightly regards Iraq’s “militia-ization” as a recipe
for civil war, and has sought to demobilize existing militias and
thwart the formation of new ones, armed Iraqi communities have
little incentive to strip themselves of means of protection. Various
groups are reportedly stockpiling and hiding weapons even as they
publicly claim to be moving toward demobilization. Moreover,
many political groups are seeking to place as many of their own
members as possible in the new Iraqi security institutions. Should
sectarian strife erupt, these institutions will likely dissolve into armed
factions, and given Iraq’s strong sectarianism and as yet weak élan
of the new Iraqi security institutions, loyalty to one’s community
almost certainly will trump ﬁdelity to those institutions.123
Domestic Political Sustainability.
The American war effort in Vietnam failed because it became
unsustainable at home. Though the United States was militarily
unbeatable in Vietnam, it lacked the political stakes in the war that
the Communists had. In the end, the Vietnam War boiled down to
a contest of political wills, and the Communists had the stronger.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk acknowledged after the war that “I
made two mistakes with respect to Vietnam. First, I overestimated
the patience of the American people, and second, I underestimated
the tenacity of the North Vietnamese.”124 General Vo Nguyen Giap,
who led Communist forces against the French and later became
North Vietnam’s minister of defense, told journalist Stanley Karnow
in 1990 that
47

We were not strong enough to drive out a half-million American
troops, but that wasn’t our aim. Our intention was to break
the will of the American Government to continue the war.
Westmoreland was wrong to expect that his superior ﬁrepower
would grind us down. If we had [attempted to pit our material
inferiority directly against your superiority], we would have been
defeated in 2 hours.125

The turning point was the Tet Offensive, a military defeat for the
Communists but a political shock for the United States. Tet, for all
to see, popped the balloon of ofﬁcial optimism on the war. For the
preceding half-year, Johnson administration spokesmen, in a White
House orchestrated campaign, declared that the corner had been
turned in Vietnam, that the Communists were in permanent retreat,
and that the end of the war was in sight. The size and savagery
of the Communist assault, which inﬂicted the highest weekly and
monthly U.S. manpower loss rates of the war, belied these claims
and suggested the prospect of an endless military stalemate, of more
and more American bloodshed without convincing progress toward
the declared U.S. objective of a Communist-free South Vietnam.126
Large public and congressional majorities, as well as editorial
opinion of such mainstream liberal newspapers as the Washington
Post and New York Times, supported U.S. military intervention in
the Vietnam War, and support for staying the course in Vietnam
remained strong, notwithstanding rising casualties and a growing
domestic anti-war movement, as long as the United States seemed,
however slowly, to be winning the war in a reasonable amount
of time.127 Underlying this support were high levels of trust in
the competence and integrity of the U.S. Government, especially
on matters of war and peace, a trust that diminished as the war
continued, and opposition to the war within America’s opinionmaking elite increased. By March 1969, a year after the Tet Offensive
and 4 years after the deployment of U.S. ground combat forces to
Vietnam, U.S. battle deaths equaled those of the highly unpopular
3-year Korean War, and nearly two out of three Americans polled
said they would have opposed U.S. entry into the Vietnam War had
they known what it would cost in American lives.128
Studies of the Vietnam and other American wars of the 20th century
reveal that, contrary to the post-Vietnam War conventional wisdom
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that profound casualty aversion dominates all other considerations
in determining war and peace decisions, most Americans are
inﬂuenced by such pragmatic considerations as the perceived stakes
at hand and beneﬁts of intervention, chances of success, possible
and actual costs, alterations in initial and subsequent expectations,
and elite opinion.129 U.S. political and military leaders may have
convinced themselves that the American public is intolerant of
casualties;130 in fact, however, “support for U.S. military operations
and the willingness to tolerate casualties are based upon a sensible
weighing of beneﬁts and costs that is inﬂuenced heavily by consensus
(or its absence) among political leaders.”131 Writing on the matter of
casualties 2 decades after the fall of Saigon but with the Vietnam
War clearly in mind, Richard K. Betts observed:
There is no clear evidence that Americans will not tolerate many
body bags in the course of intervention where vital interests are
not at stake. What is crucial for maintaining public support is not
casualties per se, but casualties in an inconclusive war, casualties
that the public sees as being suffered indeﬁnitely, for no clear,
good, or achievable purpose.132

This was certainly the situation that confronted the Nixon
administration when it took ofﬁce in 1969, and accounts in large
measure for the administration’s decision to eliminate conscription
and to launch a unilateral, incremental withdrawal of U.S. forces
from that country absent any political concessions from the
Communists.133 From April 1969 to December 1972, U.S. military
personnel in Vietnam dropped from 543,000 to 24,000, with battle
dead during the same years falling from 9,377 to 300.134 The
strength of the domestic political imperative was evident in Nixon’s
determination to proceed with a unilateral pullout even though he
clearly understood that a shrinking U.S. force presence reduced his
bargaining leverage with the Communists.
In Iraq by mid-April 2004, U.S. military dead (due to hostile action
and accidents) totaled 685, with over 3,000 additional American
troops wounded. Most of these casualties were incurred after
President Bush declared the termination of major combat operations
on May 1, 2003; that phase of the war cost the United States only 138
dead and 550 wounded.135 After May 1, 2003, casualties ﬂuctuated
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from month to month, rising to 82 dead in November then dropping
to 22 dead in February 2004, then rising again to 92 dead in just the
ﬁrst half of April. Future losses are unpredictable. Much will depend
on the general security situation in Iraq, U.S. military adaptability to
changing enemy tactics, and the degree to which expanding Iraqi
security forces can and will assume functions currently performed
by U.S. military forces. The planned transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis
on June 30, 2004, is intended to reduce U.S. loss rates, although this
increasingly appears unlikely.
Additionally, American casualties incurred in Iraq may have less
domestic political salience than those of the Vietnam War, which
was waged largely by conscripts and draft-induced “volunteers.”
Though the inequitable draft system enabled most college students
to avoid military service, many opponents of the war, including
collegiate protestors, were politicized by fear of and anger over
conscription. Today, without conscription, fewer Americans feel
their lives and futures are directly threatened by the conﬂict in Iraq
than was the case during the Vietnam War. The situation may make
the conﬂict more sustainable to the general public by removing an
important personal element from the calculation of nonvolunteers
and their families and friends, although it threatens to reduce the
number of volunteers should the war become bloodier.
Yet even reduced casualties may not guarantee sustainability in
Iraq. In the Vietnam War, casualties were not the only war cost that
undermined public support. Other costs included increased taxes,
inﬂation, diminished investment in popular domestic programs,
rising elite dissensus over the war, political turmoil at home, disdain
for South Vietnam as a worthy ally, and a growing “credibility gap”
between ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial portrayals of what was going on in
Vietnam. However, as a 1985 Rand Corporation study pointed out,
casualties “are the most visible and least tolerable cost imposed
by direct U.S. combat involvement in sustained limited wars.
Mounting casualties tend over time to undermine public support
for limited wars, and in addition serve as a lightning rod for public
dissatisfaction with other issues.”136 Robert Komer, who directed
the paciﬁcation program in Vietnam, told a Rand Corporation
interviewer after the war that:

50

The most obvious and immediate cost is the cost of casualties.
The death notices in the newspapers and so forth. Remember
what it costs you in blood is much more politically visible than
what it costs you in treasures . . . . Casualties become a problem
because they are cumulative. You spend a lot of money, but then
you have another appropriation the following ﬁscal and the year
after that. But casualties mount up, and they have a psychological
and political impact over time.137

Other studies support casualties as the primary barometer of
American public support (or lack of support) for limited wars, which
are often prolonged and waged in faraway places, with military
restraint, and on behalf of abstract objectives.138 It is widely believed
that democracies in general have great difﬁculty prosecuting
protracted wars for limited objectives. Such wars are, as was
Vietnam, wars of choice rather than wars of necessity, which engage
existential interests. Vietnam certainly deviated from the preferred
American way of war. Americans have not been comfortable with
limited wars because they tend to separate war and politics, believing
that war is a substitute for, rather than an extension of, politics.
Once the shooting begins, and regardless of political objective, so
the thinking goes, the aim should be the enemy’s total military
defeat. The “unconditional surrender” formula of Ulysses S. Grant
and Franklin D. Roosevelt has been the ideal, not the compromise
Korean War armistice or the hesitant gradualism that many still
believe led to America’s defeat in Vietnam.139
The question of whether the Iraq War of 2003 was a war of necessity
is one of several key factors bearing on the political sustainability of
the ongoing U.S. effort to create a stable, prosperous, and democratic
Iraq. Another key factor will be Americans’ judgments on the war’s
ongoing costs as weighed against perceived gains. If the Iraq War
comes to be seen as a war of choice rather than a war of necessity, then
its costs may require compensation by some additional measure of
national security gain, such as the as yet unrealized and increasingly
unlikely recession of Arab radicalism and a wider acceptance of the
United States in the Middle East.
In the absence of national security gains, Americans may feel
comforted by such humanitarian gains as the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein’s monstrous regime. But Americans could become very
impatient should the rationale for a continuing and costly U.S.
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occupation of Iraq shift to a more direct focus on uplifting the Iraqi
people, especially if the Iraq public appears ungrateful and turns
hostile.
To date, there is no evidence that U.S. casualty rates in Iraq, which
are a fraction of those incurred in Vietnam, have generated sufﬁcient
public sentiment to evacuate Iraq or even reduce U.S. objectives in
that country. Nor, unlike the Vietnam War, has the Iraq War and
its aftermath caused inﬂation and prompted increased taxes; on
the contrary, inﬂation has been minimal and tax relief has been the
order of the day. Nor has there been any disruptive antiwar turmoil
in the streets (which during the Vietnam War was fueled in part by
conscription) or effective congressional check on administration Iraq
policy.
On the other hand, public and congressional tolerance for
casualties may have dropped by virtue of failure to ﬁnd any
WMD in Iraq or to uncover any convincing evidence of a prewar
operational relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, to say nothing
of Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, U.S. taxpayer costs
in Iraq, together with tax cuts and other factors, are contributing to
unprecedented annual federal deﬁcits and a cumulative national
debt that could have perilous economic consequences in the long
run.
Prewar portrayals of a “grave and gathering” threat posed by
Saddam Hussein to the United States and its overseas interests
convinced many that preventive war against Iraq was a necessity-and therefore worth considerable risk and loss. But the postwar
deﬂation of that portrayal suggests that Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
was a war of choice and as such, like Vietnam, a war bounded by
signiﬁcant limits on public tolerance of risk and loss. Reinforcing these
limits are the unexpected difﬁculties and costs the United States has
encountered in Iraq since the President declared the termination of
major combat operations in that country. Prewar assertions that U.S.
forces would be universally welcomed as liberators inside Iraq, that
U.S. occupation authorities would inherit functioning government
infrastructure capable of providing essential government services
pending the restoration of sovereignty, and that Iraq’s restored oil
revenues would ﬁnance its economic reconstruction all foundered on
the rocks of Iraqi insurgent attacks on U.S. forces and reconstruction
targets, Iraq’s administrative disintegration, and the discovery that
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Iraq’s oil, power, and water infrastructure was crippled far beyond
expectation.140
Yet the long-term effect on public opinion of these disparities
between expectations and realities remains to be seen. The U.S.
death toll in Iraq is low by the standards of past major wars, and
most Americans in a presidential election year are preoccupied with
other matters. A mid-December 2003 CNN/USA Today/Gallup
poll revealed that 61 percent of Americans polled believed that the
situation in Iraq was worth going to war for (v. a negative response
of 35 percent), and that 53 percent believed Saddam was personally
involved of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States (v. 42 percent). Sixty-ﬁve percent of those polled expressed
approval of the way the United States was handling the situation in
Iraq since the termination of major U.S. combat operations there (v.
34 percent).141 These numbers suggest that most Americans at the
end of 2003 still regarded the Iraq War as a war of necessity and so
far worth the cost in blood and treasure.
Polls taken in the ﬁrst three months of 2004, however, registered
a signiﬁcant decline in public support. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup
poll taken January 29 to February 1 revealed that only 49 percent
of those polled believed that it “was worth going to war in Iraq,”
and that 43 percent believed that the “administration deliberately
misled the American public about whether Iraq [had] weapons of
mass destruction.” The same poll also found that only 46 percent
approved of the way the administration “is handling the situation
in Iraq.”142 This decline in public support was conﬁrmed in two
subsequent March polls by the Washington Post-ABC News and the
Wall Street Journal-NBC News.143 A Gallup Poll taken in early April
revealed that only 50 percent of the American public believed that it
was “worth going to war” in Iraq (47 percent said it was not worth
going to war), and that 64 percent believed that things were “going
moderately badly, or very badly” in Iraq (only 34 percent believed
things were going “very well or moderately well.”)144
As of mid-April 2004, the scope and costs of the U.S.
counterinsurgency war in Iraq appeared politically sustainable,
until problems in the Shi’ite areas raised new questions about the
possibility of a wider war. The Iraqi insurgency, at this point,
nevertheless bears no comparison in terms of size, ideological appeal,
and political base to the Communist challenge we faced in Vietnam.
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This could change, however, if the insurgency were to expand in a
sustained and meaningful way to Iraq’s majority Shi’ites or if the
Iraqi state were violently to disintegrate into its constituent sectarian
parts. In either of these circumstances--a national liberation war
against a detested occupier or Iraq’s “Lebanonization”--it would
be extremely difﬁcult for the United States to maintain its military
position, to say nothing of its political objectives, in that country.
A major determinant of the course of events in Iraq will be
Iraqi responses to the U.S. transfer of sovereignty to an as yet
undetermined Iraqi political entity, scheduled for June 30. Will that
entity command sufﬁcient legitimacy and security forces to lead
Iraq into stable and popular governance, or will it prove too weak to
survive the eruption of centrifugal political forces inside Iraq?
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Though policymakers instinctively turn to what they think history
teaches about what to do, or not do, in a given foreign policy situation,
reasoning by historical analogy is an inherently risky business. No two
historical situations are identical, and policymakers’ knowledge of
history is often poor. Policymakers are, in any event, predisposed to
embrace analogies, however faulty, that support preferred policy.143
Thus proponents of the Iraq War embraced the Munich analogy (and
the success of U.S. state-building in Japan and Germany), whereas
opponents of war warned of another Vietnam. Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM achieved the “Munich” objective of eliminating a regime
that proponents believed posed a gathering threat to the United
States. Yet satisfaction of that objective simply confronted the
United States with the unexpectedly costly and difﬁcult challenges
of state-building in circumstances of ongoing insurgent violence that
some were prepared to label a Vietnam-like quagmire.
2. The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and overthrow the Saddam Hussein
regime cannot be repealed. As in Vietnam in 1965, U.S. power and
prestige have been massively committed in Iraq, and it is incumbent
upon the United States try its best to leave behind in Iraq a “better
peace” than it found there, even if that means reconsidering some
ambitious U.S. objectives in Iraq. What if, for example, the United
States is forced to choose between stability and democracy in that
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volatile country? Many experts believe that genuine democracy lies
beyond the power and patience of the United States to create in Iraq.
If so, both Americans and Iraqis might have to settle for some form
of benign quasi-authoritarian rule along the lines of Kemal Ataturk’s
Turkey, Anwar Sadat’s Egypt, and King Hussein’s Jordan, perhaps
as a prolonged transition to more representative governance.
However, under no circumstances--other than the descent of Iraq
into uncontrollable civil war--should the United States abandon Iraq
as it did South Vietnam in 1975. Indeed, abandonment would seem
a near-guarantee of civil war, which could be a worse state of affairs
for the average Iraqi than even the Stalinist tyranny of Saddam
Hussein.146
3. Policymakers must recognize that the differences between Iraq
and Vietnam greatly outweigh the similarities, especially in the military
dimensions of the two conﬂicts. That said, it would be a mistake
to underestimate Iraqi insurgents as the United States did the
Vietnamese Communists in Indochina. After all, the very appearance
of an insurgency after the termination of major U.S. combat
operations surprised many. Moreover, though the nature, size, and
appeal of the Iraqi insurgency bears no comparison to its Vietnamese
Communist counterpart (except in so far as both insurgencies are
expressions of irregular warfare), the Iraqi insurgency has so far and
with increasing skill attacked targets that are key to Iraq’s successful
reconstruction. Dismissing the insurgents as “terrorists” and “deadenders” overlooks the potentially dangerous downstream political
consequences of establishing a large American force presence in
an Arab heartland and attempting to transform Iraq into a proWestern democracy. It was not expected that the minority Sunni
Arab community would welcome a post-Saddam Iraq in which it
no longer enjoyed a monopoly of power; but neither was it expected
that U.S. postwar policies in Iraq would alienate many Shi’ites-some of them to the point of armed resistance, raising the prospect
of a two-front insurgency.
4. Policymakers must also recognize and understand the two most
instructive dimensions of the Vietnam analogy for the current situation in
Iraq: the challenges of state-building, and the need to maintain sufﬁcient
domestic political support. On these two matters, the lessons of
Vietnam need to be studied. State-building in Iraq could fail for the
same principal reason it failed in South Vietnam: inability to create a
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political order commanding popular legitimacy. Nor should openended domestic political support be taken for granted. The late
President Richard Nixon once remarked: “When a president sends
American troops off to war, a hidden timer starts to run. He has a
ﬁnite period of time to win the war before the people grow weary
of it.”147 As of this writing, the U.S. forces have just entered their
second year in Iraq. If one were to follow the Vietnam War analogy,
U.S. forces are in the spring of 1966--still 2 years away from the Tet
Offensive, and almost 7 years away from the ﬁnal U.S. military
withdrawal from the conﬂict. However, the decisionmakers of 1965
could take for granted more sustainable levels of public support
precisely because they did not, in contrast to the decisionmakers
of 2003, have the cautionary experience of the Vietnam War behind
them.
5. Policymakers also should not take for granted the absence of hostile
external state intervention in Iraq. The absence of a North Vietnam
analog in Iraq could change, depending on the course of events.
For example, Iran, which has strong state and theocratic interests in
Iraq that have so far been well-served by the U.S. destruction of the
Saddam Hussein regime and the subsequent disorder in Iraq that
has tied down U.S. ground forces that might otherwise have been
available to threaten regime change in Teheran, is well-positioned
to sponsor accelerated chaos in Iraq.148 Iran has no interest in the
resurrection of a powerful Iraq, and certainly not a democratic,
pro-Western Iraq, and it has enough Revolutionary Guards and
intelligence operatives to “get tens of thousands of Iraqi Shiites on
the streets to protest the U.S. occupation.”149
AFTERWORD
In closing this analysis, it is important to recognize perhaps the
most important difference between the Vietnam War and the current
conﬂict in Iraq: the former is a ﬁnished event, whereas the latter is
an event in progress. We know what happened to Vietnam and U.S.
policy there in the 1960s and 1970s; in contrast, the ultimate fate of
Iraq and U.S. policy objectives in that country remains to be seen.
Accordingly, some judgments on the differences and similarities
between Iraq and Vietnam are necessarily tentative and could
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change as events unfold. This analysis is a snapshot of the apparent
differences and similarities between Iraq and Vietnam taken in the
spring of 2004.
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